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Abstract
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is an innovative technology which exploits the
laws of quantum mechanics to generate and distribute shared secret keying material.
QKD systems generate and distribute key by progressing through a number of distinct
phases, typically in a serial manner. The purpose of this research is to identify these
phases, their relationships to each other, as well as their relationship to time, memory
space, computational requirements, and hardware resources. A mathematical model is
developed which enables the study of critical system parameters, identifies and
demonstrates potential bottlenecks that affect the overall key generation rate of serial
implementations, and facilitates the analysis of design trade-offs in terms of parameters
associated with specific implementations. Existing models of throughput performance
make use of secure key rate equations which do not account for detailed system
parameters and performance characteristics, particularly in the post-processing phases. In
this research we build a model that is abstract enough to be applied to a wide range of
QKD system configurations. The results of the model form an accurate prediction of
throughput. The analysis contained herein provides QKD practitioners guidance in
system analysis and design.
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A SYSTEM-LEVEL THROUGHPUT MODEL FOR
QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION

I. Introduction
1.1 Problem Statement
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a method that offers theoretical
unconditional security in the transmission of secure cryptographic key between two
parties. As a key distribution technique, it is unique in that an eavesdropper can be
detected during transmission over the quantum channel. This is made possible by
employing the laws of quantum mechanics. Observation of quantum information
effectively changes its state in transit, which will increase the error rate between the
communicating parties. When paired with an unconditionally secure cryptosystem, such
as the One-Time Pad (OTP), it possesses the potential for provable informationtheoretically secure communications, with the conservative attribution of all errors to an
eavesdropping adversary [1].
The performance of QKD with respect to key generation rate is determined by
many factors, such as loss and inefficiency associated with photon transmission, the need
to correct errors, and mechanisms to assure an eavesdropper has gained little to no
information about the key. As a result, in its current state QKD systems often generate
key at too low of a rate to use OTP for transmission of large data sets. The rate at which
systems can generate usable keying material is highly dependent on its design and
implementation. Research in the field of QKD performance has primarily been focused
1

on improving throughput (i.e. key generation rate) by increasing the performance of
individual components, protocols, algorithms, hardware, etc., of a particular system
bottleneck [11, 14, 20]. Novel solutions have historically been devised for
implementation-specific problems, such as alterations to system components to achieve a
secret key rate at a particular distance, of which system-wide implications are not well
understood [26].
General throughput equations exist that claim to give predictive assessments on
final key rates, but the scarcity of input parameters into these equations makes their
accuracy coarse at best. No credence is given to the monumental task of classical
information processing or the time it takes to accomplish relative to quantum
transmission. The problem with using the current throughput equations is two-fold: they
are not comprehensive enough to offer end-to-end insight when designing new QKD
systems, and offer no avenue to study or search for optimizations in systems that have
already been implemented. In order to find an ideal system configuration, a throughput
model that captures implementation specifics is required. This can be accomplished
mathematically with a thorough and in-depth understanding of the many
interdependencies between input parameters to the QKD protocol phases.
1.2 Research Purpose
Most modern implementations of QKD increase key generation rate by selecting
from optimal best practices and available technology at each phase of the system. For
example, during Quantum Exchange the performance of optical detectors in Bob is
determined by hardware available when the system was designed. Detectors are limited
2

by detection rates and recovery time dictated by the hardware. Similarly, Alice’s ability
to generate ideal single photons is currently not possible given similar hardware
limitations, forcing her to attenuate pulses down to some probability of single photon
generation.
QKD cannot be accomplished without the use of both a quantum channel and a
classical channel. Classical processing presents its own unique problems in that both
algorithms and their implementations must be selected and communication between Alice
and Bob can only occur at the speed limited by latency constraints. For example,
regardless of the reconciliation algorithm used (e.g., Cascade, Winnow, LDPC) and its
optimized implementation (e.g., FPGA, parallel GPU), there is an upper bound on the
speed at which information reconciliation can occur, given the computational complexity
and the number of messages that must be passed between Alice and Bob [20]. Little
research has been published in the way of optimizing the system as a whole when
designed, given there are certain limiting factors which govern the overall speed of QKD.
The phases of operation of a QKD system are often processed in serial fashion:
encoded photons are exchanged for some arbitrary amount of time or Bob has received an
arbitrary number of photons, quantum exchange ceases and sifting begins until
completion, sifting ceases and error estimation begins on the sifted key, etc. [28]. For a
serial process such as this, there exist dependencies throughout the system which QKD
practitioners must consider. The purpose of this research is to develop a mathematical
model which incorporates system-specific performance criteria that may be used in
addition to the generally accepted throughput rate equations for the enhanced study of
Quantum Key Distribution systems.
3

This thesis seeks to answers the following research questions:
RQ1: What are the parameters that define a Quantum Key Distribution system?
RQ2: What phases exist in all Quantum Key Distribution systems?
RQ3: What are the necessary input and output parameters to define a phase?
RQ4: Can the notion of system time and performance be measured at the phase level?
RQ5: Can a system-level throughput model be developed that incorporates time, system
memory, computational power, and the speed of classical communication?
RQ6: If so, how can it be used to answer fundamental performance questions of QKD
such as, “How many Quantum Exchange, Error Reconciliation, and Privacy
Amplification routines are necessary to achieve a desired amount final key?”
RQ7: What are the implications of altering the amount of Alice’s memory allocated for
Quantum Exchange?
RQ8: What are the implications of altering computational power for Alice and Bob?
RQ9: How can this model be used to study Quantum Key Distribution systems?
1.3 Research Goals
The goal of this research is to model and study end-to-end QKD systems through
the buildup of a series of “mini models” at the protocol phase level. Specifically, this
overarching model will incorporate performance parameters associated with quantum
transmission, classical transmission, algorithmic complexity and execution, various
information theory techniques, and performance of specific hardware components present
in the system. The intent is to provide a useful mechanism (i.e., tool or model) for QKD
practitioners in the initial design or optimization of system configurations.
4

In this thesis, we illuminate the various relationships, interdependencies,
consequences, and implications of the numerous design decisions required to implement
QKD processes, with the goal of providing the cursory understanding necessary for the
QKD practitioner to design their own system.
1.4 Thesis Structure
The remainder of this thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter II is a
literature review of pertinent background information to understand Quantum Key
Distribution systems and the performance trade-offs in their design and implementation.
Chapter III discusses the research methodology used to answer relevant questions from
Chapter I. Chapter IV provides an in-depth discussion on how the model was developed,
the mathematical equations that govern it, the sequence of classical communications, and
a discussion of phase implementation in practical QKD systems. In Chapter V, we
generate a baseline configuration used to gauge the effectiveness of the model, as well as
model outputs. In Chapter VI, outstanding research questions are answered, conclusions
from this research are discussed, and future work in this area is proposed.

5

II. Literature Review
2.1 Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to present the necessary background to understand
the research proposed in Chapter III and IV. This discussion will present topics that are
not covered explicitly in Chapter III and IV. In particular, the history of cryptography
will be reviewed along with the use of cryptosystems for non-confidentiality purposes.
Next, the need for secret key distribution is presented along with the current practice of
public-key distribution. The advent of Quantum Key Distribution and the need for it will
then be examined along with its most popular protocol.
2.2 Classical Cryptography
Cryptography is the study and implementation of techniques that ensure
information remains confidential. The techniques from this field can also be used to
authenticate communications, apply signatures, and offer non-repudiation. We will focus
on the problem of confidentiality in the form of ciphers, or cryptographic algorithms.
The goal of a cryptographic algorithm is to transform a message, or plaintext, into
an unreadable and seemingly useless set of data, known as the ciphertext, by means of
encryption. The intended recipient, however, possesses the knowledge to revert the
transformed message to its original form and gain the ability to read it. This knowledge
comes in the form of a secret key. In modern cryptosystems, the algorithm is usually a
known entity, taking both the plaintext message and secret key as inputs. According to
Kerchoff’s principle, the real security of a cryptosystem should rely on the security of the
key, rather than the secrecy of the algorithm [33].
6

In a large network of communicating parties, it is not practical to change the
algorithm used between every pair of individuals or nodes. The same algorithm is agreed
upon by all communicating parties, and each pair will instead share a secret key. The key
the sender uses to encrypt messages is the same as the key used by the recipient to
decrypt messages. Encrypted communication with this attribute is known as symmetrickey cryptography, in which the same key is used for both encryption and decryption.
Popular examples of these algorithms used today include the Data Encryption Standard
(DES), the Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES), and the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) [36].
There exists a single known symmetric-key algorithm that is both informationtheoretically secure and offers perfect secrecy, known as the One-Time Pad. Informationtheoretic security is the ability to remain unbreakable in the presence of an adversary with
unlimited computing power. To have perfect secrecy, knowledge of the ciphertext must
not reveal any additional knowledge of the plaintext. The One-Time Pad is relatively
simple compared so other symmetric ciphers. A secret key string of bits are randomly
selected, equal to the bit length of the message to be sent. The random bits are then XORed to the original message and transmitted to the recipient. As long as the message
receiver has the random bit string, the XOR on the ciphertext can be undone to reveal the
plaintext, as shown in Figure 1.

7

Figure 1. The One-Time Pad Algorithm

A secret key for the One-Time Pad carries several stipulations: it must be truly
random, it must be as long as the message being sent, and must never be reused. This
introduces two problems with its use: generating enough key to use the algorithm on
large datasets and the ability to distribute the key from one party to another securely. In
modern cryptosystems, a common solution for the latter issue is the use of public-key, or
asymmetric algorithms, used to distribute the key.
2.3 Public-Key Distribution Methods
Public-key cryptography involves the use of two keys instead of one. The first key
is known as the public key, which can encrypt messages. The second key, known as the
private key, can decrypt messages. Asymmetric algorithms answer the question of
whether or not it is possible to distribute a secret message (in this case the key) between
two parties without ever physically meeting.
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The first known instance of this technique is the Diffie-Hellman key exchange
created in 1976, which is based on the calculation of discrete logarithms in a finite field
[35]. Arguably the most popular asymmetric encryption scheme is the RSA algorithm,
published a year later in 1977 by three postgraduates at MIT [34]. Much like DiffieHellman, RSA allows for the sharing of a secret key by two parties at a distance. Unlike
Diffie-Hellman, however, it relies on the integer factorization problem for its security.
That is, the difficulty of factoring a large number into two distinct prime factors. In
computational complexity theory, both the discrete logarithm and integer factorization
problems are considered difficult for a computer to solve [34]. The security of these
algorithms is such that a modern supercomputer would take millions of years of bruteforce searching to find a solution to the problem.
Supercomputing technology has made rapid advances in the last several decades.
In addition, the advent of research into quantum computers has posed a threat to security
by means of mathematical complexity. In fact, an algorithm has already been written for
a quantum computer that would allow for finding a solution to the integer factorization
and discrete logarithm problems in polynomial time, should a quantum computer come
into existence [30]. In order to combat this threat, research in the field is being conducted
to leverage the laws of quantum mechanics as a means for secure key distribution. If
possible, not only would it break the reliance on the security of unsolved problems in
mathematics and computer science, but it would allow for an efficient means of
generating secret keying material. As a result, information-theoretically secure
communications may be possible through the use of the One-Time Pad and Quantum Key
Distribution.
9

2.4 Quantum Key Distribution
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a technique that allows two communicating
parties, normally referred to as Alice and Bob in the literature, to decide on a secret key
between them. Once the secret key has been agreed upon, Alice and Bob can use it in any
of the aforementioned symmetric algorithms as well as any others. It should be noted that
QKD is not in itself a form of encryption, but merely a means of generating and
distributing (i.e., growing) key. The goal of QKD is to guarantee and maintain the
secrecy of the key.
Quantum Key Distribution relies on the laws of quantum mechanics. In particular,
QKD relies on the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle (or Principle of Indeterminacy),
entanglement, Schrödinger’s paradox, and the no cloning theorem [33]. The Principle of
Indeterminacy states that no pair of the attributes positions, energy, or time can be
measured simultaneously on an object. In quantum entanglement, the physical properties
of particle pairs or groups of particles are correlated – the quantum state of each particle
cannot be described independently. Schrödinger’s paradox states that the observation of a
quantum state collapses it, and the no cloning theorem forbids perfectly copying any
unknown quantum states.
In classical communications, information is transmitted as bit values of 1 or 0. In
quantum communications a quantum bit, or qubit, can be transmitted (or represented) as a
1, 0, or superpositions of a 1 or 0. Quantum Key Distribution represents these qubits as
photons, or particles of light, which obey the rules of quantum mechanics previously
discussed. They can be transmitted over terrestrial fiber optic cable or over an open-air
free-space channel. These principles of quantum behavior allow for the detection of the
10

presence of an eavesdropper attempting to learn information about the secret key, which
is not feasible in classical cryptography.

2.4.1 QKD Protocols
The advent of Quantum Key Distribution began with Stephen Wiesner, who proposed
the idea of encoding information on polarized photons using two conjugate bases in the
late 1960s [2]. Almost two decades later in 1984, Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard
used this concept to develop the first QKD protocol, known as “BB84,” to generate shared
secret keying material between two parties [3]. Current research in the field of QKD
attempts to build or propose practical key distribution configurations and demonstrate
their use in networked key sharing configurations.
In the BB84 polarization-based prepare and measure QKD system, the sender “Alice”
prepares quantum bits (qubits) in one of four polarization states: |↔⟩, |↕⟩, |⤢⟩, or |⤡⟩.
These qubits are encoded according to a randomly selected basis (“rectilinear” ⊕ or

“diagonal” ⊗) and bit value (0 or 1) and sent over a “quantum channel” where they are
measured by the receiver “Bob.” The quantum channel is used for photon transmission,

and can be either a dedicated optical fiber or a free-space optical communication channel,
as previously mentioned. A bit can be represented in one of two polarization bases:
rectilinear and diagonal, with the bit value of 1 encoded as 135° and 90°, while 0 is
encoded as 45° and 0°, for example [19].

11

Figure 2. Photon Polarization [19]

Alice will randomly choose a bit and basis measurement. She will transmit one photon to
Bob for each bit. Bob will then randomly choose a basis in which to measure the
polarization of any photon he receives during quantum transmission. If Bob chooses the
same basis as Alice, then both she and Bob should end up with corresponding bit values.
If he chooses the wrong basis, however, the resultant bit value will be random. Measuring
an encoded qubit disturbs its quantum state, a phenomenon unique to quantum
communications [4]. This process of preparing, sending, and measuring qubits is known
as “quantum exchange” and results in raw keys at both Alice and Bob.
After qubits are successfully exchanged between both parties, the system must employ
techniques to generate a secure and error-free secret key. This process begins by first
12

eliminating non-matching basis measurements. Bob announces his basis measurement
information (not the measured bit values) for each detected photon over the classical
communications channel. The result is a shared sifted key buffer between Alice and Bob,
in which approximately half of the raw key bits are retained and half is lost due to Bob’s
random (i.e., incorrect) basis selection. Next, any errors that exist in the sifted key buffer
will be corrected with a error reconciliation algorithm, used to minimize the amount of
information an adversary can gain during the error correction process. Finally, an
advanced information theory technique known as privacy amplification is used to ensure
that any residual information an adversary may have obtained about the secret key is
negligible. The shared secret key can then either be used to prime a symmetric encryption
algorithm such as DES, 3DES, or AES or used in the unconditionally secure One-Time
Pad (OTP) implementation.
After comparing preparation and measurements bases and eliminating the
measured bits corresponding to mismatched bases, any remaining errors (bit mismatches)
in the sifted key buffers may indicate the presence of an eavesdropper. Even if the errors
were created by channel noise or any other kind of interference, all remaining errors are
attributed to a listening adversary, conventionally known as Eve. An eavesdropper can
introduce errors into the key because she is forced to measure the photons in transmission
from Alice to Bob in order to determine their states, before resending random photons to
Bob. The no cloning theorem protects the photon transmission because it is impossible to
perfectly replicate a particle that has an unknown state [31]. At the time of measurement,
Eve has no knowledge of the basis Alice used to encode the bit, so she must guess. If she
measures incorrectly, the information encoded on the other bases is lost due the
13

Uncertainty Principle. When these photons reach Bob, his measurements will also be
random, and will only guess the correct bit 50% of the time. Eve guesses the
measurement basis correctly only 50% of the time as well, which means 25% of Bob’s
bits will differ from Alice’s bits [32].
In addition to the originally designed protocol, there are practical security
concerns that are addressed after key sifting has completed. Although all errors are
attributed to Eve, some of them may in fact naturally occur due to noise in the channel.
To address this issue, Alice and Bob will go through an error correction routine to
eliminate remaining errors. To protect against the possibility that those errors might have
been caused by Eve, and to maintain a usable key, the key buffer will go through a
privacy amplification to obtain a shortened key of which Eve has little or no knowledge.
The execution order of these processes largely remains the same from system to system,
however their logical grouping tends to differ based on interpretation.

2.4.2 Phase Grouping
In the broadest terms, the BB84 protocol can be grouped into two major phases:
quantum channel processing, and classical channel post-processing. The original protocol
defines the post-processing to consist of the Sifting phase [3]. It was not until 1992 that
the authors of the original protocol formalized the need for more post-processing in the
form of error correction and privacy amplification, as well as authenticating the public
channel [27]. The QKD post-processing aspect is often viewed differently from the
protocol phases – those that exist up to and including key sifting.
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This newfound understanding brought on differing opinions about the logical
grouping of responsibilities per phase and how many phases should exist. The most
popular groupings either consist of three or four relevant system phases. In a three-phase
interpretation, there exists [37]:
1. Quantum Exchange
2. Key Sifting
3. Classical Post-Processing
Raw Key Exchange and Sifting are identical to those described above; however
“Classical Post-Processing” encompasses Error Correction, Privacy Amplification, and
Authentication.
The four-phase interpretation views Error Correction as its own category [12]:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Quantum Exchange
Key Sifting
Error Correction
Privacy Amplification

Regardless of how the phases are grouped, the processes and procedures that exist
amongst them must be performed, in some capacity, within the Quantum Key
Distribution System. They are: a quantum transmission, key sifting, error estimation and
correction, privacy amplification, and authentication of a classical communications
channel, described in the following sections:
We eight distinct processes required for the composition of a Quantum Key
Distribution are defined as follows:
2.4.2.1 Authentication
Alice and Bob must authenticate their communication over the classical channel
before transmission. It is assumed an adversary cannot alter any message exchanged over
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the classical channel during post-processing. The periodicity of re-authentication is at the
discretion of the system designer [8].
2.4.2.2 Quantum Exchange
Alice prepares a sequence of qubits and transfers them to Bob over the quantum
channel. For example, in polarization-based BB84, Alice randomly chooses a basis for
each qubit: rectilinear or diagonal. Rectilinear basis can either be horizontal (0°) or
vertical (90°), while diagonal can be ± 45°. Alice will then map a qubit state to each

polarization. For instance, in the rectilinear basis, a 0 bit may be encoded as horizontal
and 1 as vertical. Similarly, in the diagonal basis 0 may be encoded as 45° and 1 as 135°
(or -45°) [3, 4, 19].
2.4.2.3 Raw Key Sifting
Bob must choose – at random – a basis with which to measure each qubit after
receiving encoded photon pulses from Alice. He shares these bases with Alice and she
confirms when their prepare and measure bases match. Any non-matching qubit
measurements will be discarded. The remaining key should be identical for both parties,
however channel noise or the presence of device non-idealities may inflict bit errors in
the sequence [3, 4].
2.4.2.4 Error Estimation
Before these errors can be corrected, Alice and Bob must first determine if they
have exceeded a predetermined error threshold, otherwise the unconditional security
proofs will be violated [1]. Part of Bob’s key material will be sampled at random and
compared to estimate the overall average error rate. If it is too high, Alice and Bob may
choose to abort this instance of key generation and start over [1].
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2.4.2.5 Error Reconciliation
If the error rate is below the threshold, Alice and Bob perform an error correction
scheme to ensure that they both possess identical keys. There are several reconciliation
algorithms that can be used during this process, including Cascade, Winnow, and LDPC
[20].
2.4.2.6 Entropy Estimation
Entropy loss estimation is an estimate of the amount of information Eve may
know about the now reconciled key held by Alice and Bob. As we will discuss, the
difficulty of estimating the total system entropy exists due to the multitude of design
decisions that must be made with the potential to influence entropy. This is an inherently
different problem than estimating the amount of information Eve can glean from classical
cryptographic methods that rely on computational complexity [12].
2.4.2.7 Privacy Amplification
In an effort to further minimize the amount of information Eve has about the key,
privacy amplification is used. During this process, more of the key is discarded in order
to form a more secure final key. In general, the output of Entropy Estimation will
determine the loss in final key size – the higher the entropy loss, the more key will be
sacrificed to ensure Eve knows the least amount of information possible. This is
accomplished by utilizing some variation of a Universal2 hashing function [12, 15, 42].
2.4.2.8 Final Key Generation
The Privacy Amplified buffers held by Alice and Bob are checked one final time
for consistency to ensure they are identical. This is accomplished through a final hash of
both buffers and comparison of those hashes. If they do match, the Privacy Amplified key
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can be added to the final secure key buffer for use in an encryption scheme. It is unclear
exactly how, when, and in what form this final hash should be accomplished. We will
discuss a possible solution to this problem [15, 17, 42].

2.5 Secure Key Rate Estimates
In QKD literature, the performance of the system is usually described as the
throughput of the secure key in bits per unit time [5, 18, 19]. For example, the equation in
Zhou et. al. is described as [5]:
𝑲𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒆 = 𝒒 ∙ 𝑸𝝁 �−𝑯𝟐 �𝑬𝝁 � + ∆𝟏 [𝟏 − 𝑯𝟐 (𝒆𝟏 )]� ∙ 𝒇

(1)

Ksecure = the secure key rate of a QKD system
q = protocol efficiency fraction
Qµ = photon counting rate, or gain
Eµ = Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER)
e1 = QBER caused by single photons

𝑛−1
H2(x) = − ∑𝑖=0
𝑝𝑖 ∙ 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (𝑝𝑖 ), the Shannon Entropy

Δ1 =

𝑄1

𝑄𝜇

, the ratio of single photon signals to all signals detected at Bob

f = the pulse rate at Alice

As we have discussed, QKD protocols describe the necessary processes up to and
including sifting. The secure key rate equations make a deterministic prediction of the
final key rate of the system by applying parameters that are specific to the protocol
definition, particularly to the Quantum Exchange aspect of the system.
It is understood that the classical post-processing aspect of QKD is necessary to
perform, but as such is not considered in this interpretation of gauging system
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performance. The variables listed above are specific only to the Quantum Exchange and
Sifting aspects of the system, yet the equation attempts to determine key throughput for
the system as a whole. The throughput equations in literature better serve as an upper
bound on the performance of a system based on the pulse rate of Alice’s laser. It is
difficult to gauge actual performance, however, without specific knowledge of the
implementation of computationally or communications intensive phases such as Error
Reconciliation or Privacy Amplification.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the methodology used to conduct the
analysis necessary for the development of a proof-of-concept empirical model. The
rationale for answering the relevant research questions in Chapter I will be presented, in
addition to a discussion on the experimental design and the methods that were used to
validate the model.
3.2 Baseline Configuration
A thorough study was conducted on QKD system architectures. As described in
Chapter II, and will be discussed more in-depth in Chapter IV, focus was given to
systems implementing the BB84 protocol as well as the protocol itself. To estimate the
performance of complete system designs, a system model needs to exist at a level of
abstraction to include all the phases. The intent of this research is to establish the “least
case” or the baseline at which a system can be called Quantum Key Distribution. There is
consensus in the academic community about which procedures must be accomplished in
order to be considered QKD. However, there is no universal agreement on which and
how many of these procedures should be grouped into an individual phase and in which
order each should occur.
In Chapter II, the generally recognized four phases of QKD were discussed. The
model proposed here will break these into eight distinct phases. The four generally
recognized phases were subdivided to provide a higher level of detail. For instance,
Slutsky et. al. describe entropy loss estimation, privacy amplifying the key, and
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producing the final key as a single phase called Privacy Amplification [12], whereas our
model assigns all three parts their own phase with unique inputs and outputs:

Figure 3. QKD Phase Relationships

3.3 Phase Model Development
It is worth reiterating that QKD is a technology used to distribute secret key, not
an encryption scheme, and should only be considered as such. The effectiveness of a
distribution system can be evaluated considering its performance in six areas [6]:
confidentiality of keys, authentication routine requirements, the delivered key rate,
systems robustness (behavior against denial of service, etc.), distance and location
independence of communicating nodes, and resistance to traffic analysis. Contrasted with
existing public-key distribution algorithms, there is much variability in QKD system
designs. The inherent simplicity and lack of variability in public-key distribution allows
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for ease of implementation; they are algorithms which are selected for their individual
qualities in the implementation of a complex cryptosystem or cryptographic suite. But
such a method is not without its imperfections. One fundamental question for the QKD
practitioner is: Does the cost of building such a system warrant the amount of key able to
be generated, given that QKD is at least as secure of a distribution method as public-key
distribution?
The lack of standardization in the design of QKD systems requires a level of
understanding with high granularity. The system is not a singular entity, but a
concatenation of eight distinct phases of operation. These phases define the operational
aspects of a Quantum Key Distribution system. The need for their existence is dictated by
the original protocols, such as BB84 [3]. The execution of each phase can be viewed
independently, but given the serial nature of the system phases, there exist implications
and/or consequences of design choices committed upstream (earlier phases) that affect
subsequent execution and output of the system downstream (later phases). We view the
QKD model in this way rather than as typical communications protocol stack model – the
phases are, in fact, more akin to a pipeline stage than a protocol stack [5, 6].
The model developed for this research in Chapter IV represents the independent
view of the system resource costs associated with each phase, as it relates to time,
computational workload, and memory consumption. Each subsequent discussion
highlights or enumerates the necessary considerations required in the design of a
particular phase. The models depict: the input parameters into the phase, the major
operations occurring during the phase and their resultant output as effects on the
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commodities of time and memory usage in Alice and Bob, as well inputs to the next
phase.
The throughput of the QKD system is determined by the aggregate throughput of
the phases, which is defined by a summation formula. Each discrete phase model’s output
provides, at minimum, the total time necessary to propagate through the phase, in
addition to the amount of bits remaining in Alice and Bob’s buffers at the conclusion of
the required processing defined by the protocol. The inputs were determined, by a
thorough analysis of the literature, as any tunable system parameters that could affect the
outputs. Many of the input parameters possess dependencies that affect other parts of the
system. The discrete phase equations were designed in such a way that when applied to
the overall summation formula, dependency effects manifest themselves in final
throughput. All of the dependencies that could be identified are discussed in detail in
Chapter IV. All calculations are performed using number of bytes and amount of time in
seconds, although the model is adaptable to other units of measure (e.g., kilobits,
megabits, seconds, microseconds, etc.).
For any nondeterministic calculations (i.e., any computational processing that’s
determined at runtime by randomness, such as the Quantum Bit Error Rate), a variable
for computational time is present. The value of this input variable represents the time it
takes to propagate through the phase, or to complete a particular sub-block of the phase.
For every phase aside from Quantum Exchange, communication across the public
channel is required, and often halts the processing of the phase until Alice and Bob have
communicated successfully. It is therefore natural to discuss computational time required
in conjunction with communications overhead.
23

3.4 ICOM Models, Equations, and Sequences
Each phase is discussed in Chapter IV will be modeled in the same format. First,
an ICOM (Input/Output, Controls, and Mechanisms) diagram is used to describe phase
[39]. The ICOM diagram is paramount to the understanding of the flow of information
and constraints governing execution. The following diagram shows an example of the
ICOM format:

Figure 4. Example of ICOM model

Next, a series of abstract equations will be developed for each phase which describes the
relevant behaviors of the phase (i.e., describing how inputs are converted to outputs).
Finally, each phase will have a sequence diagram depicting the necessary classical
communications required for execution. The following figure is an example of a
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sequence diagram in which the flow of communication occurs from left to right and vice
versa, while the flow of time occurs from top to bottom:

Figure 5. Example of Sequence Diagram

3.5 Baseline Configuration and Testing
After the model is defined, a configuration selected from QKD literature is used
to establish a baseline model. The published findings’ does not include all of the data in
terms of input parameters needed for the model. Therefore, known values will be
included as is, and reasonable assumptions about missing parameters are made. A series
of exploration studies are conducted to answer relevant research questions. We will
illustrate how design decision information and system behaviors can be understood, and
how system optimizations can be found. An Excel model will be developed to
encapsulate the phases into a serial sequence of phases.
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IV. QKD System-Level Model
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the development of the system-level model is described in detail.
First, an explanation of high-level system parameters will be discussed. Next, a model of
each phase will be presented along with descriptions of phase-specific parameters, the
sequence of classical communications during the phase, and a discussion of
implementations in practical QKD systems.
4.2 System Characterization Model

Figure 6. Overview of QKD System

At the system level, Quantum Key Distribution consists of the sender “Alice”, a
receiver “Bob”, a quantum channel used to transfer photons, and a classical channel that
supports conventional network communications. We first characterize each component
by defining high-level system parameters, so that system designers can better understand,
model and study the performance tradeoffs associated with particular design choices. The
model outlined here uses several important metrics to both study system performance and
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describe the system behaviors of interest. We define each of these parameters in the
following sections.
4.2.1 Alice and Bob
At a high level, we characterize the performance of a QKD system (consisting of
an Alice, Bob, and associated networks) with consideration of computer processing
power, network bandwidth and latency, and fundamental memory constraints. For
example, a phase cannot execute unless a minimum amount of memory is available.
Likewise, at the conclusion of each phase the memory usage associated with that phase
will either increase or decrease.
4.2.1.1 Memory
We describe Alice and Bob’s memory usage in terms of eight dedicated memory
blocks of configurable size: one for each of the eight phases defined in Chapter 3. These
memory blocks are pre-allocated and remain static for the duration of execution. While
this assumption might not be as accurate as a model that considers dynamic memory
allocation, it greatly simplifies modeling the entire system which provides insight into
design tradeoffs.
The following memory map depicts an example snapshot how this allocation may
be represented in the system:
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Figure 7. Example of System Memory Allocation Map

Each phase is allocated a percentage of available system memory. The total allocation
cannot exceed 100% of the available memory. However it is possible to have a total
allocation less than 100%, if desired. In general, the minimum amount of memory
required for each phase is the size of the bit buffer passing through the phase and any
additional memory overhead required for the processing of that buffer.
The additional memory overhead requirement is defined as any memory that is
required in addition to the arbitrarily large input buffer to the phase, as well as any interphase memory requirements, such as the need to store information on pulses sent and
received during Quantum Exchange. An example of additional memory requirement is
any memory that is not immediately calculable during the phase, and must be defined
from a posteriori knowledge of the system itself. For instance, in Error Reconciliation
there exists memory overhead to complete computationally complex calculations for each
block of key. The additional memory may therefore define the amount of computational
memory required per block. This requirement must be defined per individual phase, and
reduces the amount of available memory allocated for that phase.
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4.2.1.2 Workloads
Each phase implicitly carries a workload representing the amount of work the
processor must perform, captured by the “{Alice, Bob}cpu_power” parameter. Workload
varies from phase to phase, but in this model it represents a standard unit of work that is
treated equally to other units. We define one unit of work to mean a computational task
that the processor must perform. The uniformity of how we treat work units lends itself to
simplicity in a baseline configuration. The abstract workload parameters can be defined
as detailed as needed to facilitate understanding tradeoffs.
4.2.1.3 Time
Aside from the Quantum Exchange phase of QKD, all communication occurs
over the classical communications channel. The time necessary to complete this public
discussion is relative to the amount of data that must be transferred between Alice and
Bob. At minimum, each phase contains a “handshake” agreement between Alice and Bob
deciding whether or not both parties are ready to continue execution. Depending on the
phase and its implementation, any additional communications may be symmetrical (Alice
and Bob send an equal number of messages of an average size), or asymmetrical (Alice
or Bob sends many more messages than the other party, or the average size of the
messages that one party sends is much greater than the other). In this model we consider
that Alice and Bob each have a number of transactions that must be completed during
each phase, each with a uniform or average message size.
In addition to the communications overhead, the total execution time of a phase
also contains the time it takes for Alice and Bob’s processors to complete (i.e., compute)
the work associated with that phase. Each phase is associated with a static number work
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units, and Alice/Bob have a processor with a computational power defined as

𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒

. In

the definition of this model, we will assume processing power is constant across all

phases. The total time it takes to propagate through the phases will be a summation of the
times it takes for each phase to execute one or more times, dictated by system’s target
performance. Examples of performance targets include a desired final key rate, a desired
number of final key bits, a desired key buffer size as an input to Privacy Amplification, or
a desired key buffer size as an input to Error Reconciliation. The metrics used to define
the system will also be used to define the system resource cost of reaching these
performance targets.

4.2.1.4 Alice
The system-level input parameters for Alice are described in the following table:
Table 1. Alice System-Level Parameters
Parameter
Name

Units

pulse_rate

Mhz

MPN

unitless

Definition

Detailed Description

The pulse rate of Alice’s
laser.
The Mean Photon Number
(MPN)
The percentage of signal
states present in Alice’s
transmissions.

signalpercent

%

Alicetotal_memory

bytes

The total amount of memory
allocated in Alice for QKD.

Alicecpu_power

units/sec

The computational power of
Alice’s classical processor.
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The pulse rate of Alice’s represents the number of pulses
she sends per second. Example: 4 Mhz = 4,000,000
pulses/sec
The Mean Photon Number is an input to the Poisson
distribution that describes the probability of n photon(s)
appearing in a laser pulse with MPN = 𝜇, described by:
𝑃(𝑛; 𝜇) =

𝜇𝑛 ∙𝑒 −𝜇
𝑛!

QKD practitioners may choose to implement a decoy-state
protocol, which defines a percentage of the pulses sent are
signal states, decoy states, and vacuum states. The final key
rate is determined only be the number of signal-states that
are successfully received at Bob.
Alice has a finite amount of total memory that is
represented by the aggregate memory allocated by each
phase.
The power of Alice’s processor is defined by the speed at
which she can process units of work. A faster processor can
compute more units of work in less time.

4.2.1.5 Bob
The system-level input parameters for Bob are described in the following table:
Table 2. Bob System-Level Parameters
Parameter
Name

Units

Definition

Detailed Description

The loss as a result of
propagation through Bob.

𝑑𝑏_𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠_𝐵𝑜𝑏

dB

𝜂 detector

unitless

The efficiency of Bob’s
detectors.

tdead

sec

The dead time of Bob’s
detectors.

Bobtotal_memory

bytes

Bobcpu_power

units/sec

Pulses arriving at Bob have a calculable amount of loss
(dB) due to the propagation through Bob’s hardware. In
this model we use the efficiency parameter for calculations,
derived from the efficiency equation as a function of loss in
−𝑑𝐵

The total amount of
memory allocated in Bob
for QKD.
The computational power of
Bob’s classical processor.

dB: 𝐸𝑓𝑓(𝑑𝐵) = 10 10
A SPD suffers from poor detection efficiency due to
recovery times, jitter times, quench times, dark counts, and
afterpulses associated with the APD.
The dead time is a user defined period of idle time after a
detection (i.e., an avalanche event, where a SPD is “turned
off” to avoid afterpulsing). This is known as the dead time
between detections, and limits Bob’s overall detection
speed.
Bob has a finite amount of total memory that is represented
by the aggregate memory allocated by each phase.
The power of Bob’s processor is defined by the speed at
which he can process units of work. A faster processor can
compute more units of work in less time.

4.2.2 Classical Channel
A classical channel can exist in different forms, including free-space, over mixed
use optical fiber, dedicated optical fiber, a public network, or even on the same fiber as
the quantum channel. The system-level input parameters for the classical channel are
described in the following table:
Table 3. Classical Channel System-Level Parameters
Parameter Name

Units

Definition

Detailed Description

The distance between
Alice and Bob.

dist_btwn_Alice_Bob

km

delay_per_unit_length

sec/km

The delay per kilometer
incurred as a result of
propagation.

bandwidth

Mbits/s

Information capacity of
the classical channel.
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Alice and Bob share a fixed distance between them. In this
model we assume the distance of the classical channel and
the distance of the quantum channel to be equal.
The classical channel contains a delay associated with
transmission that is bounded by the speed of light, c, in
2
free-space and ∙ 𝑐 through optical fiber [40].
3
Conventional networks may also have an added delay due
to the communications protocol.
The classical channel has a limit on the amount of
information that can be transferred in a given period of
time, usually described in Mbits per second. Example: 100
Mbit/s bandwidth

All transmission times across the classical channel are calculated using the following
formula:

𝒎𝒔𝒈

(𝒃𝒊𝒕𝒔)

𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆
𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏_𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆(𝒎𝒔𝒈𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆 , 𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒘𝒊𝒅𝒕𝒉, 𝒏𝒖𝒎_𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔) = 𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒘𝒊𝒅𝒕𝒉
∙
(𝒃𝒊𝒕𝒔/𝒔𝒆𝒄)

𝒏𝒖𝒎_𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔 + 𝒕𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒔𝒔_𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑_𝒅𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒚 (𝒔𝒆𝒄)

(2)

Additionally, we will define the inputs related to the sending and receiving of messages
that are shared across all phases:
Table 4. Shared Parameters of Classical Channel Communications
Parameter
Name

Units

Definition

Detailed Description

bytes

The average size of a
message passed between
Alice and Bob that is sent
from Alice.

BA_avg_msg_size

bytes

The average size of a
message passed between
Alice and Bob that is sent
from Bob.

AB_num_trans

unitless

The number of transactions
between Alice and Bob that
are initiated by Alice.

BA_num_trans

unitless

The number of transactions
between Alice and Bob that
are initiated by Bob.

AB_avg_msg_size

In phases that require communication over the classical
channel, there is an amount of data that Alice must send to
Bob. Although it is not required that each message carry
the same amount of data, we represent the size of each
message uniformly. For each phase where
AB_avg_msg_size is defined, it is assumed that all
messages passed sent by Alice to Bob are of that size.
In phases that require communication over the classical
channel, there is an amount of data that Bob must send to
Alice. Although it is not required that each message carry
the same amount of data, we represent the size of each
message uniformly. For each phase where
BA_avg_msg_size is defined, it is assumed that all
messages passed sent by Bob to Alice are of that size.
The number of transactions from Alice to Bob multiplied
by the average message size from Alice to Bob calculates
the approximate total amount of data that is passed in that
direction. If the total number of transactions from AB are
added to the total number of transactions from BA, we
calculate the total number of transactions during the phase.
The number of transactions from Bob to Alice multiplied
by the average message size from Bob to Alice calculates
the approximate total amount of data that is passed in that
direction. If the total number of transactions from BA are
added to the total number of transactions from AB, we
calculate the total number of transactions during the phase.

In this model we assume the time it takes for Alice and Bob to communicate at the
beginning of each phase (signified by a dashed outline in the sequence diagrams) to be
insignificant.
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4.2.3 Quantum Channel
Unlike the classical channel, the quantum channel is dedicated to quantum
transmission – the transmission of photons from Alice to Bob. Its properties are similar to
those of the classical channel with some slight differences, mainly to account for losses
experienced during transmission. The system-level input parameters for the quantum
channel are described in the following table:
Table 5. Quantum Channel System-Level Parameters
Parameter Name

Units

Definition

delay_per_unit_length

sec/km

The delay per kilometer incurred
as a result of propagation.

𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠_𝑝𝑒𝑟_𝑘𝑚

dB/km

The average amount of loss, in
dB, experienced per kilometer.

Detailed Description

The classical channel contains a delay associated
with transmission that is bounded by the speed of
2
light, c, in free-space and ∙ 𝑐 through optical fiber
3
[40].
Optical communication has losses associated with
transmission. For example, optical fiber losses are
approximately 0.2 dB/km. In this model we use the
efficiency parameter for calculations, derived from
the efficiency equation as a function of loss in dB:
−𝑑𝐵

𝐸𝑓𝑓(𝑑𝐵) = 10 10

4.3 Authentication
4.3.1 ICOM Model
The following ICOM model depicts the inputs, outputs, controls, and mechanisms
relevant to the Authentication phase:
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Figure 8. Authentication ICOM Model

The inputs and outputs local to Authentication are discussed in the following
table:
Table 6. Inputs/Outputs Local to Authentication
Parameter Name

Units

𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒

bytes

𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ_𝑘𝑒𝑦_𝑟𝑒𝑞

bytes

𝑇𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ

sec

𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑟_𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒

bytes

Definition

The number of bytes in the
authentication reservoir that
can be used to authenticate a
message.
The number of bytes required
to authenticate a message.
The time required to
complete a single
authentication.

The number of bytes
remaining in the
authentication reservoir.
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Detailed Description

The size of the authentication reservoir must
be at least large enough at the beginning of
each QKD round to authenticate the
communication between Alice and Bob.
For more information, see section 4.3.4.
If the QKD practitioner chooses to
authenticate classical communications more
than once per round, then the total time it
takes to complete authentication will be a
summation of time it takes to complete a
single authentication multiplied by the
chosen number of iterations.
The number of times Alice and Bob’s
communication can be re-authenticated
during a QKD round is dictated by the
amount of key remaining in the
authentication reservoir.

4.3.2 Abstract Equations
The total amount of time required for a single authentication can be calculated
with the following equation, which describes the time it takes to transmit data between
Alice and Bob in addition to the time it takes to perform computations:
𝑻𝑨𝒖𝒕𝒉 = 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏_𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆(𝒂𝒗𝒈_𝒎𝒔𝒈_𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆{𝑨𝑩,𝑩𝑨} , 𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒘𝒊𝒅𝒕𝒉, 𝒏𝒖𝒎_𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔{𝑨𝑩,𝑩𝑨} ) +

(3)

{𝑨,𝑩}𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒌𝒍𝒐𝒂𝒅

𝑨𝒖𝒕𝒉

{𝑨,𝑩}𝒄𝒑𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓

The amount of Authentication key remaining in the Authentication reservoir after
the phase has completed execution can be calculated with the following equation:
𝒂𝒖𝒕𝒉_𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒐𝒊𝒓_𝒓𝒆𝒎𝒂𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆 = (𝒂𝒖𝒕𝒉_𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒐𝒊𝒓𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆 − 𝒂𝒖𝒕𝒉_𝒌𝒆𝒚_𝒓𝒆𝒒𝒖𝒊𝒓𝒆𝒅)

4.3.3 Sequence Diagram

(𝟒)

The following sequence diagram describes the classical communications
necessary to execute the phase, where n signifies the number of transactions required, the
purple arrow represents communication initiated by Alice, and the red arrow represents
communication initiated by Bob:
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Figure 9. Sequence Diagram of Classical Communication During Authentication

4.3.4 Discussion of Practical Implementation
In applications outside of QKD, most authentications are done by utilizing
computationally hard public-key methods. If this were the case in QKD, the security of
the entire system would effectively be reduced to the computational security of the
public-key algorithm [7]. Since QKD itself is provably information-theoretically secure,
the public channel authentication must emulate the same theoretic security on the
classical channel. The standard in QKD is the Wegman-Carter authentication scheme [8],
which is based on 𝜖-Almost Strongly-Universal2 (ASU2) hash functions, a subset of the

strongly Universal2 hash family discussed in depth in the Privacy Amplification section.
The required number of sacrificed secret key bits can be on the order of several
bytes if necessary, making the Wegman-Carter routine very efficient [41]. This is an
essential feature of QKD authentication because the system must produce more secret
key than is lost during the Authentication phase. The sacrificed number of bits grows
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logarithmically with the message size. The authentication routine can be thought of in
five steps [41]:
1) The sender (Alice) selects a message, m.
2) The sender (Alice) uses key bits, k, from previous round to create an
authentication tag for the message, where k ≈ log2(|m|).
3) The sender (Alice) discards used key bits and sends the message to the
receiver (Bob).
4) The receiver (Bob) reads the tag, computes his own based off of his own
secret key, and compares them.
5) If both tags match, the receiver (Bob) sends a message back to the sender
(Alice) confirming that the message is authentic and QKD can continue.
In order to achieve this type of authentication, Alice and Bob must acquire a
prepositioned secret key in order to agree on a priming key for the initial authentication
round. In every round thereafter, a portion of the final key from the previous iteration will
be used to authenticate the new communication. It is not advisable to consider a publickey distribution of the priming key between both parties for the same reason an
information-theoretically secure authentication method must be used – it effectively
reduces the security of the system to a computationally hard problem [6].
Standard practice in electronic communications suggests the periodic reauthentication of the communicating parties. For QKD, the frequency of this practice is
dictated by the system practitioner and has a direct impact on the final key rate, given that
the secret key used to prime the Wegman-Carter routine must come from the identical
secure key buffers shared by Alice and Bob. The nature of 𝜖-ASU2 hash functions for use

in QKD does not allow the authentication of more than a pair of messages at a time [42],
which means that new secret key must be sacrificed for every message pair. The
evaluation of the hash functions is assumed to occur in constant time.
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4.4 Quantum Exchange (QE)
4.4.1 ICOM Model
The following ICOM model depicts the inputs, outputs, controls, and mechanisms
relevant to the Quantum Exchange phase:

Figure 10. Quantum Exchange ICOM Model

The inputs and outputs local to Quantum Exchange are discussed in the following
table:
Table 7. Inputs/Outputs Local to Quantum Exchange
Parameter Name

Units

Definition

𝑚𝑒𝑚_𝑟𝑒𝑞_𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒

bytes

The amount of memory
required to store information on
each pulse.

𝑇𝑄𝐸

sec

The time required to complete
a single iteration of Quantum
Exchange.
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Detailed Description

The memory required for each pulse is, at
minimum, the space necessary to store the bit,
basis, and timing (frame and slot) information.
Alice stores information on every pulse she
sends, while Bob store information on only the
pulses he detects.
In this model we assume that Quantum
Exchange will run until Alice’s memory has
been filled before moving to the next phase. To
reach a desired number of final bits will most
likely require multiple iterations QE during a
single round of QKD. The total time of QE is
calculated by the summation of time for the

𝐴_𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟

bytes

The size of Alice’s memory
buffer after completion of QE.

𝐵_𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟

bytes

The size of Bob’s memory
buffer after completion of QE.

𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑘𝑒𝑦_𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠

bits

𝐵𝑜𝑏_𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑘𝑒𝑦_𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠

bits

total number of QE iterations.
If Alice runs QE until her memory buffer is
full, then her raw buffer size will always be the
maximum amount of memory allocated to her
QE phase.
Bob’s memory buffer will be significantly
smaller than Alices, due to his inability to store
information on pulses he does not detect.
The number of bits Alice has will be equal to
the number of pulses that she sends to Bob.

The number of bits Alice
possesses at the end of QE with
the potential to be final key
bits.
The number of bits Bob
possesses at the end of QE with
the potential to be final key
bits.

The number of bits Bob has will be equal to the
number of detections he receives.

4.4.2 Abstract Equations
The time required to complete Quantum Exchange will either be the total time it
takes for Alice to transmit all pulses required to fill her memory or the amount of time it
takes to complete the classical processing necessary to process the information associated
with each pulse, whichever takes longer. In this model the time to complete Quantum
Exchange:
𝒏𝒖𝒎_𝒅𝒆𝒕_𝒂𝒕_𝑩𝒐𝒃
+ 𝒕𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒏𝒕_𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒑_𝒅𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒚
𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍_𝒅𝒆𝒕_𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆

𝑻𝑸𝑬 = 𝒎𝒂𝒙 �

,

{𝑨,𝑩}𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒌𝒍𝒐𝒂𝒅

𝑸𝑬

{𝑨,𝑩}𝒄𝒑𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓

�

(𝟓)

The Poisson distribution is used to calculate the probability that n photons will be
present in a pulse. Thus, the cumulative Poisson probability describing the probability
that one or more photons will be present is represent with the following equation:
𝑷𝒐𝒊𝒔(𝑿 ≥ 𝟏) = 𝟏 − 𝒆−𝝁

(𝟔)

The total number of pulses that Alice sends is limited by the amount of memory
she has allocated to Quantum Exchange. If the amount of memory required to store
information (bit, basis, and timing) is known, the maximum number of pulses Alice can
send is modeled by the following equation:
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𝑨

𝒎𝒆𝒎 𝒂𝒗𝒂𝒊𝒍
𝒏𝒖𝒎_𝒑𝒖𝒍𝒔𝒆𝒔_𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 = 𝒎𝒆𝒎_𝒓𝒆𝒒_𝒑𝒆𝒓_𝒑𝒖𝒍𝒔𝒆

(𝟕)

The number of detections that will actually be received at Bob is a product of
efficiencies of the channel and Bob’s hardware, the probability that a pulse contains a
photon(s), the chosen signal percentage, and the total number of pulses sent by Alice. The
approximate total number of detections at Bob can be modeled with the following
equation:
(𝟖)

𝒏𝒖𝒎_𝒅𝒆𝒕_𝒂𝒕_𝑩𝒐𝒃 = 𝒏𝒖𝒎_𝒑𝒖𝒍𝒔𝒆𝒔_𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 ∙ 𝑷𝒐𝒊𝒔(𝑿 ≥ 𝟏) ∙ 𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒏𝒕 ∙ 𝜼𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒍 ∙ 𝜼𝑩𝒐𝒃 ∙ 𝜼𝒅𝒆𝒕

The average time between the arrival of each pulse at Bob is represented by the

inverse of the pulse rate after experiencing losses associated with photon probability,
signal percentage, and the efficiencies of the channel and Bob’s hardware in the
following equation:
𝟏

𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆_𝒃𝒕𝒘𝒏_𝒑𝒖𝒍𝒔𝒆_𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒗𝒂𝒍 = 𝒑𝒖𝒍𝒔𝒆_𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆 ∙ 𝑷𝒐𝒊𝒔(𝑿≥𝟏)∙ 𝒔𝒊𝒈

𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒄𝒆𝒏𝒕

∙ 𝜼𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒍 ∙ 𝜼𝑩𝒐𝒃 ∙ 𝜼𝒅𝒆𝒕

(𝟗)

We assume the average pulse arrival interval, 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑡𝑤𝑛_𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒_𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙 , at Bob is

uniform. To account for the scenario where the dead time of the detectors exceeds the
time between arriving pulses, we can calculate the average time between detections due
to missed pulses with the following equation:
𝒕𝒂𝒗𝒈_𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆_𝒃𝒕𝒘𝒏_𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 = 𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒍 �𝒕

𝒕𝒅𝒆𝒂𝒅

𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆_𝒃𝒕𝒘𝒏_𝒑𝒖𝒍𝒔𝒆_𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒗𝒂𝒍

� ∙ 𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆_𝒃𝒕𝒘𝒏_𝒑𝒖𝒍𝒔𝒆_𝒂𝒓𝒓𝒊𝒗𝒂𝒍

(𝟏𝟎)

The actual detection rate (per second) can then be calculated by the inverse of the

average time between detections. In the case where the dead time does not exceed the
time between arriving pulses, 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑡𝑤𝑛_𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒_𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙 , will be equal to
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𝑡𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑡𝑤𝑛_𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 . In that case the pulse arrival rate would be equal to the actual
detection rate, represented by the following equation:
𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍_𝒅𝒆𝒕_𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆 =

𝟏
𝒕𝒂𝒗𝒈_𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆_𝒃𝒕𝒘𝒏_𝒅𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏

(𝟏𝟏)

Given that Alice and Bob are required to store information about each pulse
during Quantum Exchange, we can represent the size of their raw memory buffers as the
amount of information required to store the number of pulses sent (Alice) and detections
(Bob) with the following equations:
𝑨𝒓𝒂𝒘𝒃𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓 = 𝒏𝒖𝒎_𝒑𝒖𝒍𝒔𝒆𝒔_𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕 ∙ 𝒎𝒆𝒎_𝒓𝒆𝒒_𝒑𝒖𝒍𝒔𝒆
𝑩𝒓𝒂𝒘𝒃𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓 = 𝒏𝒖𝒎_𝒅𝒆𝒕_𝒂𝒕_𝑩𝒐𝒃 ∙ 𝒎𝒆𝒎_𝒓𝒆𝒒_𝒑𝒖𝒍𝒔𝒆

(𝟏𝟐)

(𝟏𝟑)

The number of candidate key bits (i.e., bits that have the potential to become final
key bits) as a result of completing Quantum Exchange may be represented simply as
being equal to the number of pulses sent (Alice) and detections (Bob) with the following
equations:
𝑨𝑸𝑬_𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆_𝒌𝒆𝒚_𝒃𝒊𝒕𝒔 = 𝒏𝒖𝒎_𝒑𝒖𝒍𝒔𝒆𝒔_𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒕
𝑩𝑸𝑬_𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒆_𝒌𝒆𝒚_𝒃𝒊𝒕𝒔 = 𝒏𝒖𝒎_𝒅𝒆𝒕_𝑩𝒐𝒃

4.4.3 Sequence Diagram

(𝟏𝟒)

(𝟏𝟓)

The following sequence diagram describes the classical communications
necessary to execute the phase, where n signifies the number of transactions required, the
arrow pointing from Alice to Bob represents communication initiated by Alice, and the
arrow pointing from Bob to Alice represents communication initiated by Bob:
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Figure 11. Sequence Diagram of Classical Communication During Quantum Exchange

4.4.4 Discussion of Practical Implementation
The objective of this phase is to maximize photon detection at Bob while
overcoming potential obstacles in the system that limit Bob’s detection efficiency. These
realities primarily stem from the fact that neither perfect single photon generation nor
detection is possible as of this writing. To address the lack of perfect single photon
sources, photons are created at Alice with a defined probability – it is associated with
attempting to maximize photon detection under these conditions, which by implication
maximizes the final key generation rate. There are four major areas in which key
generation rates can be significantly increased [21]: improvement in detection efficiency,
increase in pulse rate at Alice, refinement of entropy estimates to reduce the amount of
required privacy amplification, and increase in Mean Photon Number (MPN or µ, as is
commonly denoted in literature). Note that QE is the only time during an iteration of the
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QKD system where bits are being added to Bob’s buffer. Successive phases seek to
reduce the bit buffer, as sacrificial bits are required to complete their tasking.
The high amount of loss over long distances is generally overcome by utilizing
Avalanche Photodiode (APD) detectors operating in the single-photon detection “Geigermode” in conjunction with a high pulse rate at Alice. The universal speed limit in these
detectors, however, is dictated by the recovery or dead time between detections. This
measurable recovery time exists due to the need to reset the device for a subsequent
detection and prevent any charge carriers (e.g., electrons of holes) that were trapped in
the device from being released during the next detector gating period, known as an after
pulse, which may result in an arbitrary detection event that increases the number of
errors. The recovery time of detectors must be long enough to limit or eliminate after
pulsing but still generate sufficient key. It is worth mentioning that most detectors operate
in a super-cooled state in order to reduce thermally generated contribution to the dark
count rate [22], where a dark count is any arbitrary detection event that is not caused by a
pulse from Alice.
The necessity for a recovery time of several microseconds forms one of the most
important bottlenecks in overall system performance [21]. In addition, the efficiencies of
APD detectors tend to be very low, typically around 10-20% [9]. In fact, the most
fundamental trade-off in the operation of SPDs is that between dark count rate and
photon detection efficiency [22]. A balance must exist then between Alice’s pulse firing
rate and Bob’s ability to detect photons after incurring channel loss in the fiber, poor
efficiency, and dead times. Since Alice must store information on every pulse she sends,
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if her pulse rate is too high she will quickly run out of available memory. Conversely, if
her pulse rate is too low, the final key generation rate will be insufficiently low.
Another critical factor in determining the photon counting rate at Bob as well as
final key rate is the selection of an optimal Mean Photon Number, or MPN. As stated, the
lack of true single photon sources requires that Alice’s pulses be attenuated so that they
approximate single photon pulses. Bennett & Brassard, the original authors of the BB84
protocol, suggested the use of µ = 0.1, however “contrary to frequent misconception,
there is nothing special about a µ value of 0.1, even though it has been selected by most
experimentalists” [29]. In other words, a system utilizing this probability will produce, on
average, one pulse containing at least one photon for every ten pulses Alice generates
according to the Poisson distribution. It is possible to increase the final key generation
rate by simply increasing the MPN. In fact, the optimal probability is slightly over 1.0;
however optimality varies between distinct systems [21]. The consequence of increased
MPN is increased multi-photon entropy, which should be accounted for during the
Entropy Estimation phase, and is the critical input parameter affecting how Privacy
Amplification is performed. If the appropriate safeguards are built into the Entropy
Estimation phase for a reasonable expectation of Eve’s abilities, “one can in fact safely
operate with a larger MPN … without any adverse effects on security” [21]. The major
advantage of an increased MPN is an immediate increase in key generation without any
detriment to system resources, namely memory space. A higher µ value increases the
number of pulses that contain photons – pulses which have already been accounted for in
memory by Alice. Thus, Alice’s memory and MPN are independent, whereas Alice’s
memory usage and pulse rate are perfectly correlated.
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The notion of dark counts in these detections, in terms of representation within the
mathematical model, is such that if a dark count occurs, the result would be a skew in the
number of detections at Bob, which is potentially more detrimental to the accurate
representation of performance of a system than the actual ratio of dark counts to signal
detections. If we assume Quantum Exchange will cease once Alice has produced an
arbitrary number of pulses, yielding an equivalent bit count in her raw key buffer, the
dark count rate will marginally skew the number of detections at Bob, potentially
introducing errors. Dark counts and after pulsing therefore manifest their effects in the
form of a higher error rate. As a result, if the calculated error rate exceeds its threshold
during Entropy Estimation, no key will be generated in that particular iteration of the
QKD system due to termination of execution. In general, the limit of secret key
generation is the point which the probability of a dark count meets or exceeds the
probability of detecting a signal bit [4], but dark count probabilities are so small that we
did not include them in our general model. However, we note that when path loss is high
(e.g., due to long propagation distances) and the photon detection probability becomes
low, dark counts may become significant, and even dominate the detection rate. The
desired speed of final key generation rate must be considered with the total distance of
the system, which is true for all QKD implementations.
4.5 Sifting
4.5.1 ICOM Model
The following ICOM model depicts the inputs, outputs, controls, and mechanisms
relevant to the Sifting phase:
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Figure 12. Sifting ICOM Model

The inputs and outputs local to Sifting are discussed in the following table:
Table 8. Input/Outputs Local to Sifting
Parameter Name

Units

𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑒𝑓𝑓_𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐

unitless

The approximate ratio of
detections to correct basis
measurements, as defined by the
protocol.

Definition

𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑓𝑡

sec

The time required to complete the
sifting process.

𝐴_𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟

bytes

The size of Alice’s sifted key
buffer.

𝐵_𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟

bytes

The size of Bob’s sifted key
buffer.
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Detailed Description

The BB84 protocol, for instance, dictates that
approximately half the time Bob will choose the
correct basis measurement. The incorrect
measurements will be discarded.
The time required to complete Sifting consists of
the time it takes transfer all of Bob’s basis
measurements to Alice, for Alice to reply to Bob
with the correct/incorrect measurements, and the
processing time it takes to adjust the size of the bit
buffers.
After Alice eliminates pulses from her buffer with
mismatched basis measurements, discards pulses
that Bob did not detect and removes the extraneous
information (basis, timing, etc.) stored on the
remaining pulses, she is left with a sifted bit buffer.
The size of Bob’s sifted key buffer is the result of
applying the sifting efficiency fraction and
eliminating all unnecessary information that was
required for Quantum Exchange (basis, timing,
etc.)

4.5.2 Abstract Equations
The total time required to sift the raw key buffer is determined by the time it takes
to transmit required data across the classical channel in addition to the computational
time required, represented by the following equation:
𝑻𝑺𝒊𝒇𝒕 = 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏_𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆(𝒂𝒗𝒈_𝒎𝒔𝒈_𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆{𝑨𝑩,𝑩𝑨} , 𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒘𝒊𝒅𝒕𝒉, 𝒏𝒖𝒎_𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔{𝑨𝑩,𝑩𝑨} ) +
{𝑨,𝑩}𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒌𝒍𝒐𝒂𝒅

𝑺𝒊𝒇𝒕

{𝑨,𝑩}𝒄𝒑𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓

(𝟏𝟔)

After sifting has completed, Alice and Bob are no longer required to possess the
basis and timing information for each bit. Therefore the size of Bob’s sifted bit buffer is
the result of removing both the unnecessary information about each pulse and
mismatched basis measurements between himself and Alice. This process can be
represented mathematically by the following equation:
𝑩𝒔𝒊𝒇𝒕𝒃𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓 = 𝒔𝒊𝒇𝒕_𝒆𝒇𝒇_𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒄 ∙

𝑩𝒓𝒂𝒘𝒃𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓

𝒎𝒆𝒎_𝒓𝒆𝒒_𝒑𝒖𝒍𝒔𝒆

(𝟏𝟕)

The size of Alice’s bit buffer should be equal to Bob’s after removing all
extraneous information related to erroneous basis measurements:
𝑨𝒔𝒊𝒇𝒕𝒃𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓 = 𝑩𝒔𝒊𝒇𝒕𝒃𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓

(𝟏𝟖)

4.5.3 Sequence Diagram
The following sequence diagram describes the classical communications
necessary to execute the phase, where n signifies the number of transactions required, the
purple arrow represents communication initiated by Alice, and the red arrow represents
communication initiated by Bob:
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Figure 13. Sequence Diagram of Classical Communication During Sifting

4.5.4 Discussion of Practical Implementation
At minimum, the completion time of Sifting will require the time it takes to
transmit all of the measurement basis information from Bob’s raw key buffer to Alice in
a series of messages across the classical channel, and a response from Alice for each
message. Note that this is only one example of an implementation. In fact, Alice could
theoretically send all of her basis preparation information to Bob and force him to
complete the necessary processing to match and compare his measurements on received
photons to Alice’s entire buffer, then communicate that information back to her. The
consequence of completing sifting in the latter fashion is the major increase in
communications overhead that is required across the classical channel, which is directly
correlated to the amount of loss on the quantum channel. Alice must store in memory, in
some way, information about each pulse sent. At minimum, this includes the bit value,
basis measurement, and timing information. Given the high amount of loss described in
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the previous Quantum Exchange section, if Alice communicates all of her pulse
information to Bob after a Quantum Exchange that experienced 90% loss, there will be
nine times as many messages required across the classical channel than if Bob initiated
the Sifting phase by sending his basis measurements first.
There is a significant increase in available memory space after the Sifting phase
has completed. In a signal-state-only BB84 implementation, for instance, the protocol
efficiency fraction will be approximately one half [18]. In other words, 50% of Bob’s raw
key buffer will be discarded in addition to Alice discarding her entire buffer except those
which matches Bob’s buffer. Memory, however, is finite. Leveraging the memory space
bottleneck is one of the most difficult challenges in the design of a QKD system. It limits
the total number of photons that can be “in play” within the system at any given time, and
is initially governed by the amount of loss in the channel. Until the Sifting phase has
completed, Alice has to maintain information on every pulse that she sends, whereas Bob
can only record what he detects. And as such, Alice suffers from a proportional increase
in memory requirement to the amount of loss she must incur. The memory space being
utilized in Alice is therefore disproportionately larger than in Bob before Sifting.
The nature of serialized phase execution dictates that before an attempt can be
made to generate more key, the previous iteration of the system must have completed
operation. It is therefore of interest to maximize the amount of key generated per system
iteration while decreasing the time it takes to achieve the desired output of keying
material. In general, the more signal bits detected at Bob during Quantum Exchange, the
larger the output of secure key will be. The prospect of infinite detections, however, is
hedged by the practical need for Alice to store information on all transmitted photons, the
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loss in both the channel and Bob, and the inefficiencies of Bob’s detectors. Given
practical limitations on the size of Alice’s memory, a balance must be achieved between
the amount of desired key in a given window of time, at a particular distance, for a single
iteration of the system. It is crucial to affirm this concept as it relates to the Sifting phase
because memory requirements, particularly for Alice, are at their peak at the conclusion
of Quantum Exchange and the start of the Sifting.
4.6 Error Estimation
4.6.1 ICOM Model
The following ICOM model depicts the inputs, outputs, controls, and mechanisms
relevant to the Error Estimation phase:

Figure 14. Error Estimation ICOM Model

50

The inputs and outputs local to Error Estimation are discussed in the following
table:
Table 9. Input/Outputs Local to Error Estimation
Parameter Name

Units

𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠_𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑑_𝑝𝑐𝑡

%

The percentage of the sifted key
buffers sacrificed to provide an
error estimate.

𝑇𝐸𝑟𝑟𝐸𝑠𝑡

sec

The time required to complete
Error Estimation.

𝐴_𝐸𝑟𝑟𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟

bytes

The size of Alice’s Error
Estimated key buffer.

bytes

The size of Bob’s Error
Estimated key buffer.

𝐵_𝐸𝑟𝑟𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟

Definition

Detailed Description

The percentage of eliminated sifted key for Error
Estimation is entirely dependent on the needs of the
practitioner. If a more accurate estimation is
desired, the percentage can be increased at the
detriment of final throughput.
The time to complete sifting consists of
communications time to transfer the sacrificed bits
across the classical channel and processing time for
error estimation calculations.
The size of the Error Estimated buffer equals the
size of the input sifted key buffer after eliminating
the bits sacrificed percentage of the key.
The size of the Error Estimated buffer equals the
size of the input sifted key buffer after eliminating
the bits sacrificed percentage of the key.

4.6.2 Abstract Equations
The total time required to estimate the error percentage of the sifted key buffer is
determined by the time it takes to transmit required data across the classical channel in
addition to the computational time required, represented by the following equation:
𝑻𝑬𝒓𝒓𝑬𝒔𝒕 = 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏_𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆(𝒂𝒗𝒈_𝒎𝒔𝒈_𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆{𝑨𝑩,𝑩𝑨} , 𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒘𝒊𝒅𝒕𝒉, 𝒏𝒖𝒎_𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔{𝑨𝑩,𝑩𝑨} ) +
{𝑨,𝑩}𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒌𝒍𝒐𝒂𝒅

𝑬𝒓𝒓𝑬𝒔𝒕

{𝑨,𝑩}𝒄𝒑𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓

(𝟏𝟗)

The size of the error estimated buffers for both Alice and Bob are determined the
percentage of bits that are saved multiplied to the sized of the sifted key buffer,
represented by the following equation:
{𝑨, 𝑩}𝑬𝒓𝒓𝑬𝒔𝒕𝒃𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓 = (𝟏 − 𝒃𝒊𝒕𝒔_𝒔𝒂𝒄𝒓𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒅𝒑𝒄𝒕 ) ∙ {𝑨, 𝑩}𝑺𝒊𝒇𝒕𝒃𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓
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(𝟐𝟎)

4.6.3 Sequence Diagram
The following sequence diagram describes the classical communications
necessary to execute the phase, where n signifies the number of transactions required, the
purple arrow represents communication initiated by Alice, and the red arrow represents
communication initiated by Bob:

Figure 15. Sequence Diagram of Classical Communication During Error Estimation

4.6.4 Discussion of Practical Implementation
Time of completion in Error Estimation is primarily determined by how quickly a
sampling of sacrificed bits can be transmitted between the parties. The Error Estimation
phase presents the QKD practitioner with an opportunity to have a significant impact on
the amount of final key generated by dictating the amount of key sacrificed to calculate
the error rate. The trade-offs between sacrificing too much key or too little key can be
significant. By sacrificing a high percentage of key it is also an immediate deduction in
potential key at the conclusion of the final phase. But from this we gain a highly accurate
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estimate of the error rate, which may save vital resources required to propagate further
through the system (assuming the error rate does not exceed the error threshold). A
highly accurate error rate will also pay dividends during calculations for Error
Reconciliation (e.g., performance optimization if the error rate is used to select the initial
starting block size in the highly interactive Cascade algorithm). We must also consider
that when leveraging phase execution time against amount of final key produced, there
must be an intersection between how much final key is retained during Error Estimation
and the subsequent gain in memory and final throughput per QKD iteration.
4.7 Error Reconciliation
4.7.1 ICOM Model
The following ICOM model depicts the inputs, outputs, controls, and mechanisms
relevant to the Error Reconciliation phase:
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Figure 16. Error Reconciliation ICOM Model

The inputs and outputs local to Error Reconciliation are discussed in the following
table:
Table 10. Input/Outputs Local to Error Reconciliation
Parameter Name

Units

Definition

𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠_𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑑

unitless

The number of bits sacrificed for
each Error Reconciliation
routine.

𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒

bits

The required input block size to
perform an Error Reconciliation
routine.

𝑇𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑐

sec

The total time required to
complete a round of Error
Reconciliation.

𝐴_𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟

bytes

The size of the Error Reconciled
buffer.

𝐵_𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟

bytes

The size of the Error Reconciled
buffer.

𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑒𝑟𝑟_𝑟𝑒𝑐

unitless

The total number of Error
Reconciliation routines required
to process the input buffer.
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Detailed Description

Some QKD error correction algorithms sacrifice
bits as a result of their processing. The most
common algorithms, such as Cascade and LDPC,
do not.
An error correction algorithm may have an optimal
chosen block size that maximizes performance. In
the case of LDPC, required a fixed input size based
on the standard matrix selected for processing.
The time to complete Error Reconciliation depends
highly on the algorithm chosen, its interactivity on
the classical channel, and computational
complexity.
The size of the Error Reconciled buffer will be the
same size as the Error Estimated buffer (assuming
no bits are lost due to algorithm choice).
The size of the Error Reconciled buffer will be the
same size as the Error Estimated buffer (assuming
no bits are lost due to algorithm choice).
The need to perform Error Reconciliation by block
size means multiple rounds will be required if the
input to Error Reconciliation exceeds the block
size.

4.7.2 Abstract Equations
The total time required to complete Error Reconciliation, assuming that a single
iteration of the algorithm occurs at a time, is equal to the time it takes to complete a
single block of input key multiplied by the number of total blocks in the error estimated
input buffer. We also assume that if the number of blocks does not divide the error
estimated buffer evenly, the last block will be padded in order for the algorithm to run
successfully, defined by the following equation:

𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒍 �

𝑻𝑬𝒓𝒓𝑹𝒆𝒄 =

{𝑨,𝑩}𝑬𝒓𝒓𝑬𝒔𝒕

𝒃𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓

𝒃𝒍𝒐𝒄𝒌𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆

�∙

�𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏_𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆(𝒂𝒗𝒈_𝒎𝒔𝒈_𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆{𝑨𝑩,𝑩𝑨} , 𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒘𝒊𝒅𝒕𝒉, 𝒏𝒖𝒎_𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔{𝑨𝑩,𝑩𝑨} ) +

{𝑨,𝑩}𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒌𝒍𝒐𝒂𝒅

(4)

𝑬𝒓𝒓𝑹𝒆𝒄

{𝑨,𝑩}𝒄𝒑𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓

�

The size of the error reconciled buffer will be equal to the size of the error
estimated buffer minus the number of bits sacrificed during all iterations of the algorithm
(if any):
{𝑨, 𝑩}𝑬𝒓𝒓𝑹𝒆𝒄𝒃𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓 = {𝑨, 𝑩}𝑬𝒓𝒓𝑬𝒔𝒕𝒃𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓 − (𝒏𝒖𝒎_𝒃𝒊𝒕𝒔_𝒔𝒂𝒄𝒓𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒅 ∙ 𝒏𝒖𝒎_𝒆𝒓𝒓_𝒓𝒆𝒄)

(𝟐𝟐)

The total number of error reconciliation iterations depends on the number of

blocks contained in the error estimated buffer, represented by the following equation:
𝒏𝒖𝒎_𝒆𝒓𝒓_𝒓𝒆𝒄 = 𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒍 �

{𝑨,𝑩}𝑬𝒓𝒓𝑬𝒔𝒕
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𝒃𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓

𝒃𝒍𝒐𝒄𝒌𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆

�

(5)

4.7.3 Sequence Diagram
The following sequence diagram describes the classical communications
necessary to execute the phase, where n signifies the number of transactions required, the
purple arrow represents communication initiated by Alice, and the red arrow represents
communication initiated by Bob:

Figure 17. Sequence Diagram of Classical Communication During ER

4.7.4 Discussion of Practical Implementation
The timing equation for Error Reconciliation exists at a level of abstraction to
represent the three major reconciliation algorithms, namely Cascade, Winnow, and LDPC
(Low Density Parity Check). More importantly, it is robust enough to identify the inverse
relationship between the number of messages sent and the computational time required
for that dataset. For instance, Cascade requires high cost in communications overhead
given a relatively large number of messages, which is variable depending on the error
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rate. It benefits, however, from low computational complexity and necessary memory
space for the calculations that need to be performed, requiring 1 to 2 bytes per bit of data
to be reconciled [20]. Latencies of a network are generally much higher than those of a
CPU, which creates a bottleneck in processing in the case of Cascade. Winnow and
LDPC represent the opposite scenario, requiring a very low number of communications
and much higher computational time. In addition, necessary memory space for
computation requires 20 to 30 bytes of memory per bit of data to be reconciled [20].
A strict sense of time is an important consideration for final throughput given that
the algorithm chosen is viable. There are other considerations and trade-offs specific to
each algorithm, however, that must not be ignored by the practitioner of a QKD system.
For instance, Winnow suffers from the potential to induce errors during processing, and
is therefore less effective than Cascade when discussing accuracy in the absence of time.
Winnow also requires a privacy maintenance step in which a small amount of key is
sacrificed during calculation – a step which is absent in both Cascade and LDPC [10].
Cascade also suffers from a higher variability in processing time, given that the number
of messages that will be required per iteration is dictated by the error rate. Similarly, for
LDPC codes the size of the error correction code and the computation time also depend
upon the estimated error rate. The expected window of completion with respect to time
would therefore need to be larger to account for that variability.
A study conducted at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
quantified the speed differential between FPGA implementations of Cascade and LDPC.
It found that the throughput for Cascade dropped off from 5 Mbits/s to 3 Mbits/s between
0 and 100 km. LDPC, however, remained closer to a constant 2 Mbits/s [20]. This proved
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that the performance of Cascade is dictated mainly by the increased latency over the
classical channel at greater distances. In short, the algorithm chosen is still highly
implementation-specific regardless of its theoretical characteristics. The most intriguing
part of the study, however, was that each throughput figure exists on a per-thread basis.
That is, LDPC has the potential to run 2 Mbits/s per thread at 100 km. This presents the
ability for linear scaling with parallel instantiations, with an upper bound on the thread
count limited by the available memory, recalling that the required memory per bit
reconciled is an order of magnitude larger for LDPC and Winnow than it is for Cascade.
4.8 Entropy Estimation
4.8.1 ICOM Model
The following ICOM model depicts the inputs, outputs, controls, and mechanisms
relevant to the Entropy Estimation phase:

Figure 18. Entropy Estimation ICOM Model
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The inputs and outputs local to Authentication are discussed in the following
table:
Table 11. Input/Outputs Local to Entropy Estimation
Parameter Name

Units

Definition

%

The percentage of
key lost due to
entropy loss on the
quantum channel.

𝑝𝑐𝑡_𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦_𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠_𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐

%

The percentage of
key lost due to
entropy loss during
Error Reconciliation.

𝑝𝑐𝑡_𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦_𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠_𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖_𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑛

%

The percentage of
key lost due to
multi-photon pulses.

𝑝𝑐𝑡_𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦_𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠_𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦

%

The percentage of
key lost due to
arbitrary safety
margin.

𝑇𝐸𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑠𝑡

sec

The time required to
complete Entropy
Estimation.

𝐴_𝐸𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟

bytes

The size of the
Entropy Estimated
buffer.

𝐵_𝐸𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟

bytes

The size of the
Entropy Estimated
buffer.

𝑁𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒

bytes

The number of bits
that can be saved
after Privacy
Amplification.

𝑝𝑐𝑡_𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦_𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠_𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑅

Detailed Description

Imperfect transmission on the quantum channel
results in the possibilities of errors, all of which
are attributed to Eve. Any leaked information as a
result of this transmission must be subtracted
away from the final key.
Information is leaked during transmission of data
across the classical channel during Error
Reconciliation. Although these leaks occur in the
form of parity information, an estimated amount
of information about the key Eve might glean
from this information must be subtracted away
from the final key.
Information is potentially leaked with the presence
of multi-photon pulses. Defense against the
possibility of a Photon-Number Splitting attack
may result in subtracting away the probability of
all multi-photon pulses from the final key.
An arbitrary amount of information may also be
subtracted from the final key as a “safety net” to
protect against any unaccounted for entropy loss.
The time required to complete Entropy Estimation
is marginal, give that both Alice and Bob know
the entropy estimation routine. Communication
across the classical channel may not be required to
complete Entropy Estimation.
The Entropy Estimated buffer will equal the size
of the input Error Reconciled buffer. The bit
buffers remain unaffected during Entropy
Estimation.
The Entropy Estimated buffer will equal the size
of the input Error Reconciled buffer. The bit
buffers remain unaffected during Entropy
Estimation.
The number of secure bits that can be saved postPrivacy Amplification is calculated by the
summation of the entropy loss percentages applied
to the Error Reconciled buffer.

4.8.2 Abstract Equations
The total time required to estimate the entropy loss is determined by the time it
takes to transmit required data across the classical channel in addition to the
computational time required, represented by the following equation:
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𝑻𝑬𝒏𝒕𝑬𝒔𝒕 = 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏_𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆(𝒂𝒗𝒈_𝒎𝒔𝒈_𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆{𝑨𝑩,𝑩𝑨} , 𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒘𝒊𝒅𝒕𝒉, 𝒏𝒖𝒎_𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔{𝑨𝑩,𝑩𝑨} ) +

(𝟐𝟒)

{𝑨,𝑩}𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒌𝒍𝒐𝒂𝒅𝑬𝒏𝒕𝑬𝒔𝒕
{𝑨,𝑩}𝒄𝒑𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓

Considering no bits are lost during entropy estimation, the size of the entropy

estimated buffer is identical to the size of the error reconciled buffer, represented by the
following equation:
{𝑨, 𝑩}𝑬𝒏𝒕𝑬𝒔𝒕𝒃𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓 = {𝑨, 𝑩}𝑬𝒓𝒓𝑹𝒆𝒄𝒃𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓

(𝟐𝟓)

The number of bits that can be saved during the upcoming Privacy Amplification
phase can be represented by the percentage of key remaining after losses multiplied to
size of the error reconciled buffer, as shown in the following equation:
𝑵𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒆 = (𝟏 − 𝒕𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍_𝒆𝒏𝒕_𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒔_𝒑𝒄𝒕) ∙ {𝑨, 𝑩}𝑬𝒓𝒓𝑹𝒆𝒄𝒃𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓

(6)

4.8.3 Sequence Diagram
The following sequence diagram describes the classical communications
necessary to execute the phase, where n signifies the number of transactions required, the
purple arrow represents communication initiated by Alice, and the red arrow represents
communication initiated by Bob:
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Figure 19. Sequence Diagram of Classical Communication During Entropy Estimation

4.8.4 Discussion of Practical Implementation
Although the execution requirements for this phase are trivial, the implications for
the security of the overall system are significant. Time and space requirements for
Entropy Estimation are minimal. The Nsecure processing is at most an O(1) operation [3].
It is assumed that the inputs into the algorithmic calculation have been gleaned and
retained from prior phases.
Earlier in this thesis we claimed that QKD as a distribution system is markedly
different than public-key distribution methods. This notion becomes most apparent when
discussing the representation of security in the form of a proof. Recent research has
suggested that the catchall nature of proofs in conventional cryptography, in which Eve’s
actions are confined to the limits of mathematical processing, do not apply to QKD [11].
This stems from the fact that the exchange of quantum material is probabilistic, and as a
result relies on the system’s practitioner to estimate the entropy loss, or how much
information Eve may have gleaned during Quantum Exchange. It is unclear if it is
possible to know whether or not the amount of entropy accounted for is indeed provably
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secure, because unlike in conventional cryptography, the physical components (i.e.
design choices of hardware) influence the theoretical security. It is therefore necessary to
recognize the sources of entropy loss and its causes in order to generate a sufficient
estimate of entropy loss.
Information leakage presents itself in three key areas [12, 23]: the presence of
multi-photon pulses during Quantum Exchange, disclosure of block checksums or parity
bits during Error Reconciliation (also known as the public discussion), and any
eavesdropping that occurs on the quantum channel. Since it is impossible to distinguish
between channel noise and eavesdropping, most security analyses make the conservative
attribution of any detected errors to the presence of Eve. Of the few recognized entropy
estimates based on information theory that exist, none take into account all three sources
of entropy. The original BBBSS92 estimate from Bennett, et al. [27], Slutsky et al.’s
Defense Frontier Analysis [12], and the Myers-Pearson estimate [23] are mostly
concerned with information learned from measuring single-photon pulses, which is
“intimately related to the observed error rate” [23]. Furthermore, within the singularly
focused source of entropy, Eve is assumed to be conducting individual attacks in which
she measures photons independently. The disregarded alternative, known as a coherent
attack, occurs when Eve can measure several photons at the same time, which is
infeasible without the advent of quantum memory.
The other two sources of information leakage, multi-photon pulses and public
discussion, are not entirely ignored but rather account for their miscalculation in what
Slutsky et al. refer to as an “arbitrary safety margin,” which is subtracted from the final
estimate for single-photon pulses to create an Nsecure number of bits that can be used as
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final key. The focus on a perceived error rate as the primary source of entropy stems from
the fact that a “combination of a low error rate and high information leakage is unlikely
no matter what strategy the eavesdropper uses” [12]. The amount safety margin added is
at the discretion of the practitioner to ensure a desired level of security. Higher estimates
may be desired for added security. However, this will result in a smaller number of final
bits, more Privacy Amplification, and a reduced final key rate. A balance must be
achieved between security requirements and desired final key rate with the stipulation
that the input QBER to Entropy Estimation be no greater than 11%, which is the point at
which the Shannon entropy reaches zero [1]. In other words, an upper bound under which
the QKD system remains provably secure.
The final number of Nsecure bits can be derived with the following equation [13]:
𝑵𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒆 = 𝑵𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓 (𝟏 − 𝒉𝟐 (𝑸𝑩𝑬𝑹)) − 𝑵𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒅 − 𝑵𝒎𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒊 − 𝑵𝒔𝒂𝒇𝒆𝒕𝒚

(7)

Nsecure = final number of usable secure bits after Privacy Amplification
Ncorr = number of bits after Error Reconciliation

h2(x) = −𝑥 ∙ log(𝑥) − (1 − 𝑥) ∙ log (1 − 𝑥), the binary entropy function
QBER = actual Quantum Bit Error Rate

Nleaked = number of bits revealed during Error Reconciliation
Nmulti = number of bits that must be discarded due to multi-photon pulses
Nsafety = number of bits to be used as an arbitrary safety margin
In this model we chose not to neglect entropy loss as a result of public discussion.
Although entropy loss cannot be directly estimated without running a real
implementation of Error Reconciliation, we can instead use the Shannon bound for the
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minimum amount of information that will be revealed during an error correction routine.
In fact, it is not possible to perform error correction without exposing information. The
ratio between number of bits, 𝑁, needed to correct a sifted key of length 𝜂 is given by
[43]:

𝑵
𝜼

= −𝒆 ∙ 𝒍𝒐𝒈𝟐 (𝒆) − (𝟏 − 𝒆) ∙ 𝒍𝒐𝒈𝟐 (𝟏 − 𝒆)

(8)

where e is the observed error rate in the sifted key. This ratio is then multiplied to the
number of bits in the sifted key, and reveals the amount of information that must be
discarded. As long as we assume that an error correction routine is being used that is
close to the Shannon bound, then use of a conservative safety margin should make the
loss estimate a reasonably close approximation to the losses in a real system.
To estimate the entropy loss as a result of multi-photon pulses, we chose to
implement a revised version of the conservative BBBSS92 estimate [27], which states
that the percentage of discarded signal bits is equal to the probability of a multi-photon
pulse. This probability can be described with the Poisson distribution [21]

𝒎=𝟏−

𝝁𝒆−𝝁

𝟏−𝒆−𝝁

(9)

where 𝜇 is the Mean Photon Number. The irony of QKD is that although it is supposed to

offer provable information-theoretic security in conjunction with a One-Time Pad, the

existence of non-idealities in the system (i.e. lack of single photon source or detection,
channel loss, etc.) make it evident that “the security that can be achieved is not absolute
but probabilistic in nature” [12].
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As discussed, this probabilistic security begins during Quantum Exchange, in
which a Mean Photon Number is selected. We can increase system throughput by simply
increasing the MPN, but as a consequence must alter our Entropy Estimate, and by
implication the amount of Privacy Amplification incurred in order to maintain the same
level of security. In fact, the optimal MPN value, which will provide the highest levels of
both key rate and security, depends on the optical losses in the channel and on
assumptions about Eve’s technology [29]. By altering the arbitrary safety margin in the
so-called entropy “defense function” to account for any new information Eve may have
learned, it may be possible to safely operate with a much higher MPN. Specifically, we
must account for an increase in the possibility for multi-photon pulses, which we recall
are not directly considered in the standard entropy estimation functions. Pearson &
Elliott have come to the conclusion that although there are numerous factors that affect
key rate (most of which have been highlighted in this paper), that regardless of which
initial entropy estimate is chosen (BBBSS92, Slutsky’s Defense Frontier, Myers-Pearson
estimate, etc.), the ideal µ value “will always be slightly over 1.0” – this translates into a
ten-fold increase in system throughput compared to an MPN of 0.1 [21].
4.9 Privacy Amplification (PA)
4.9.1 ICOM Model
The following ICOM model depicts the inputs, outputs, controls, and mechanisms
relevant to the Privacy Amplification phase:
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Figure 20. Privacy Amplification ICOM Model

The inputs and outputs local to Authentication are discussed in the following
table:
Table 12. Input/Outputs Local to Privacy Amplification
Parameter Name

Units

𝑚𝑖𝑛_𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑟𝑒𝑞_𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠

bits

The minimum number of
required bits necessary to
perform Privacy Amplification.

Definition

𝑁𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒

bytes

The number of bits that can be
saved after Privacy
Amplification.

𝑇𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝐴𝑚𝑝

sec

The time required to complete
Privacy Amplification.

𝐴_𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟

bytes

The size of Alice’s Privacy
Amplified buffer.

𝐵_𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟

bytes

The size of Bob’s Privacy
Amplified buffer.
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Detailed Description

To reduce finite key size effects, it is
recommended that the input to Privacy
Amplification bet at least 1 Mbit [38].
The number of secure bits that can be saved postPrivacy Amplification is calculated by the
summation of the entropy loss percentages applied
to the Error Reconciled buffer.
The time required to complete Privacy
Amplification is dictated mainly by computational
processing power to do mathematical operations on
large numbers.
The size of the Privacy Amplified buffer will be
equal to the size of Nsecure. More specifically, Nsecure
bits will be selected from the Privacy Amplified
buffer after the computing the Universal-2 hash
algorithm.
The size of the Privacy Amplified buffer will be
equal to the size of Nsecure. More specifically, Nsecure
bits will be selected from the Privacy Amplified
buffer after the computing the Universal-2 hash
algorithm.

4.9.2 Abstract Equations
The total time required to privacy amplify the entropy estimated key buffer is
determined by the time it takes to transmit required data across the classical channel in
addition to the computational time required, represented by the following equation:
𝑻𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒗𝑨𝒎𝒑 = 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏_𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆(𝒂𝒗𝒈_𝒎𝒔𝒈_𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆{𝑨𝑩,𝑩𝑨} , 𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒘𝒊𝒅𝒕𝒉, 𝒏𝒖𝒎_𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔{𝑨𝑩,𝑩𝑨} ) +
{𝑨,𝑩}𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒌𝒍𝒐𝒂𝒅

𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒗𝑨𝒎𝒑

{𝑨,𝑩}𝒄𝒑𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓

(10)

The size of the privacy amplified buffer will now be equal to the number of bits
that can be saved as a result of entropy estimation, represented by the following equation:
{𝑨, 𝑩}𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒗𝑨𝒎𝒑𝒃𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓 = 𝑵𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒆

(11)

4.9.3 Sequence Diagram
The following sequence diagram describes the classical communications
necessary to execute the phase, where n signifies the number of transactions required, the
purple arrow represents communication initiated by Alice, and the red arrow represents
communication initiated by Bob:
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Figure 21. Sequence Diagram of Classical Communication During PA

4.9.4 Discussion of Practical Implementation
The completion time of Privacy Amplification, much like Error Reconciliation, is
highly dependent on its implementation and the specific algorithm chosen. The goal of
Privacy Amplifying a key is to apply the leftover hash lemma to the error reconciled key.
The lemma states that if there exists an n-bit secret key X of which Eve knows 𝑡 < 𝑛

bits, we can produce a key of approximately 𝑛 – 𝑡 bits of which Eve has no knowledge, if
Alice and Bob were to randomly and secretly select a one-way hash function ℎ ∈ 𝐻
family of hash functions [24].

By convention, in QKD a hash family is chosen that exhibits 2-universality. That
is, a 2-universal hash function is one which the probability of collision between two
1

distinct input keys is 𝑚 for every possible function ℎ ∈ 𝐻, where m is the number of

possible outputs of the hash function h [15]. More formally, a family of hash functions
mapping A to B is said to be 2-universal if [14]:
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𝐏𝐫{𝒉: 𝒉(𝒙) = 𝒉(𝒚)} ≤

𝟏

|𝑩|

for all 𝒙 ≠ 𝒚,

(12)

where h is a randomly chosen hash function. There are several well-known classes of
functions that exhibit such behavior suitable for use as a hash family, including
multiplication of binary matrices (specifically Toeplitz matrices), modular affine
transforms, multiplication in finite fields, and multiplication in binary fields [16]. The
Privacy Amplification phase contains two parts: computation of the privacy amplified bit
buffer, and the selection of final secure bits. The computation performs the one-way 2universal hash function previously described, and the final secure bit selection uses the
output of the Entropy Estimation phase to select the least-significant Nsecure bits from the
bit buffer.
As an example, we will select the first 2-universal hash function described by
Wegman & Carter, in the form of a modular affine transform [15]:
𝑲𝒇𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒍 = (𝒎 ∙ 𝑲𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 + 𝒏) 𝒎𝒐𝒅 𝒑

(13)

Kfinal = key buffer from which final secure key will be selected
Kcorrected = error corrected key buffer
m,n = large composites < p, where 𝑚 ≠ 0

p = large prime ≥ Kcorrected

The calculation of Kfinal technically has O(1) computational complexity, as does

Entropy Estimation. However, the size of the Kcorrected buffer is on the order of hundreds
of thousands (if not over a million) bits, which makes the seemingly straightforward
calculation much more computationally intensive due to the sheer size of the numbers.
Alice and Bob must also first agree, randomly and secretly, on the input parameters m, n,
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and p across the classical channel, which adds to the time through the phase. Although
the class of functions can be publicly known, in this case affine transformations, the
selection of a specific hash function from the hash family must be kept secret for it to
remain universal [24].
At the output of Privacy Amplification there will indeed be a shorter, more secure
key, but the hashing algorithm itself does not perform the reduction. The hash function
will return a bit buffer, Kfinal, roughly the same size as the input buffer, Kcorrected. It is not
until we select the least significant Nsecure bits from this buffer that we possess a privacy
amplified key. Therefore the throughput implications come from the estimated loss of
entropy in the previous phase and not from Privacy Amplification itself. Perhaps the only
trade-off in system performance during this phase is the selection and implementation of
the algorithm. Any hash family, so long as it is proven 2-universal, can be used. Some
hash families, such as Toeplitz matrix hashing [14], will naturally have better
computability than others, and may be more desirable for implementations in which the
speed of post-processing is a critical factor.
4.10 Final Key Generation
4.10.1 ICOM Model
The following ICOM model depicts the inputs, outputs, controls, and mechanisms
relevant to the Final Key Generation phase:
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Figure 22. Final Key Generation ICOM Model

The inputs and outputs local to Authentication are discussed in the following
table:
Table 13. Input/Outputs Local to Final Key Generation
Parameter Name

Units

Definition

𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑟_𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠

bits

The number of bits reserved for
the Authentication reservoir.

𝑇𝐹𝐾𝐺

sec

The time required to complete
Final Key Generation.

𝐴_𝐹𝐾𝐺𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟

bytes

The size of Alice’s Final Key
Generation buffer.

bytes

The size of Bob’s Final Key
Generation buffer.

𝐵_𝐹𝐾𝐺𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟
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Detailed Description

A small number of final key bits must be
reserved for Authentication of the next round of
QKD.
The total time required to complete FKG
involves the computational time to compute the
hash of the final key by Alice and Bob, and the
comparison of those hashed across the classical
channel.
The size of the final key buffer is the size of the
Privacy Amplified buffer after the reduction of
reserved bits for the Authentication reservoir.
The size of the final key buffer is the size of the
Privacy Amplified buffer after the reduction of
reserved bits for the Authentication reservoir.

4.10.2 Abstract Equations
The total time required to privacy amplify the entropy estimated key buffer is
determined by the time it takes to transmit required data across the classical channel in
addition to the computational time required, represented by the following equation:
𝑻𝑭𝑲𝑮 = 𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔𝒎𝒊𝒔𝒔𝒊𝒐𝒏_𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆(𝒂𝒗𝒈_𝒎𝒔𝒈_𝒔𝒊𝒛𝒆{𝑨𝑩,𝑩𝑨} , 𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒘𝒊𝒅𝒕𝒉, 𝒏𝒖𝒎_𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒔{𝑨𝑩,𝑩𝑨} ) +
{𝑨,𝑩}𝒘𝒐𝒓𝒌𝒍𝒐𝒂𝒅

𝑭𝑲𝑮

{𝑨,𝑩}𝒄𝒑𝒖𝒑𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓

(14)

The size of the final key buffer will be equal to the size of the privacy amplified
buffer with a slight reduction due to the need to reserve bits for the authentication
reservoir, as described in the following equation:
{𝑨, 𝑩}𝑭𝑲𝑮𝒃𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓 = {𝑨, 𝑩}𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒗𝑨𝒎𝒑𝒃𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓 − 𝒏𝒖𝒎_𝒂𝒖𝒕𝒉_𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒐𝒊𝒓_𝒃𝒊𝒕𝒔

(15)

4.10.3 Sequence Diagram
The following sequence diagram describes the classical communications
necessary to execute the phase, where n signifies the number of transactions required, the
purple arrow represents communication initiated by Alice, and the red arrow represents
communication initiated by Bob:

72

Figure 23. Sequence Diagram of Classical Communication During FKG

4.10.4 Discussion of Practical Implementation
Although Error Reconciliation’s purpose is to provide matching key buffers
between Alice and Bob with very high probability, there is still the possibility of masked
errors existing in one or more key buffers. Even if only one bit is incorrect, the final key
is useless. To protect against this scenario, standard practice is to hash the final key
buffer after Privacy Amplification to make sure that keying material held by Alice and
Bob does indeed match. Bennett & Brassard suggest conducting this step during Privacy
Amplification, comparing the pre-privacy amplified key buffer, before the final reduction
[17]. The practice of using a 2-universal hash function, however, is not cryptographic in
nature, but sufficient for only randomizing the input [25].
The other problem with this approach is the use of the final key as input to the
hash function. This effectively reduces the security of the QKD system to the security of
the hashing algorithm itself. To protect against this security reduction, we suggest an
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alternative hashing routine which doesn’t include the use of the final key directly. Since
the goal of a final hash is to prove all bit errors were corrected during the Error
Reconciliation phase, the errors are assumed to be corrected at the conclusion of that
phase. In fact, the error corrected buffers are assumed to be identical; otherwise Privacy
Amplification would be fruitless. It would then be beneficial to use the error corrected
key buffer as the input to the final hash. If their comparison over the classical channel
matches, it is assumed the final secure key will also match if Alice and Bob perform
identical mathematical operations on the key thereafter. If the hashing is done in this way,
even if the error corrected key buffer is recovered from a one-way, computationallysecure hash algorithm, an adversary would additionally require specific details of the
algorithm chosen during Privacy Amplification as well an accurate knowledge of Alice
and Bob’s entropy loss estimation routine.
In addition, it may be beneficial to add additional safety margin to our entropy
loss estimate, if desired. It is unclear if and how much entropy is lost during the
conversion from a message to message digest in the application of a cryptographic hash
function [25]. For this reason, an entropy loss adjustment can be viewed as adding
additional arbitrary safety margin rather than introducing another variable in the
calculation of Nsecure (refer to Figure 3):
𝑵𝒔𝒆𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒆 = 𝑵𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓 (𝟏 − 𝒉𝟐 (𝑸𝑩𝑬𝑹)) − 𝑵𝒍𝒆𝒂𝒌𝒆𝒅 − 𝑵𝒎𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒊 − 𝑵𝒉𝒂𝒔𝒉 − 𝑵𝒔𝒂𝒇𝒆𝒕𝒚

We can conservatively assign Nhash to be the number of output bits of the chosen
cryptographic hash function. Again, the consequence of increasing the amount of
information Eve might know results in a reduction of final keying material.
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(16)

V. Baseline Configuration and Use Case
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter a baseline configuration is introduced that is used to study the
relevant research questions presented in Chapter I. First, a list of modeling assumptions is
made about implementing a practical QKD system in the model. Next, the parameter
values that make up the baseline configuration are introduced and their resulting
performance is discussed. Finally, the research questions pertinent to QKD performance
are answered using the model and an analysis is provided of the results.
5.2 Modeling Assumptions of Practical QKD
In the representation of the configuration used in this model, we make the following
assumptions about the implementation of a practical Quantum Key Distribution system:
1) The quantum channel and classical channel are both optical fiber of the same
length.
2) Communication over the classical channel is accomplished using the TCP/IP
protocol with a maximum transmission unit (MTU) of 1500 bytes.
3) The propagation delay over both the quantum and classical channels is two-thirds
the speed of light [40].
4) The bandwidth of the classical channel is 100 Mbits/s [45].
5) Alice and Bob share the identical processing power and total memory size.
6) The protocol efficiency fraction for BB84 is 0.5.
7) Authentication is done once per round of QKD.
8) Authentication is done using a Wegman-Carter 𝜖-Almost Strongly Universal2
hash function [8].
9) Alice ceases Quantum Exchange when her allocated QE memory is filled.
10) Weak coherent optical pulses arriving at Bob are uniformly spaced.
11) The information required for each pulse can be stored in 5 bytes for both Alice
and Bob.
12) A maximum message size (MTU) is 1500 bytes.
13) The LDPC error correction algorithm is being used with a standard matrix that
has a required block size of 54000 bits [20].
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14) The memory overhead required to perform the LDPC algorithm is 30 bytes per bit
[20].
15) LDPC can be performed with a number of bits less than the block size if it is
padded to meet the block size requirement [20].
16) No communication is necessary to complete Entropy Estimation [20].
17) The minimum number of required bits as an input to Privacy Amplification is 1
Mbit [38].
18) If an insufficient amount of key is generated to conduct Privacy Amplification,
Quantum Exchange is restarted.
19) Privacy Amplification implements a Strongly Universal2 hash function using a
Toeplitz matrix.
20) The matrix required to do Privacy Amplification hashing is approximately twice
the size of the input to the Privacy Amplification phase [14].
21) A cryptographic hash function, SHA-512, is being used to perform Final Key
Generation.
22) The minimum amount of memory necessary to perform small operations (e.g., the
computation of a cryptographic hash) is 1024 bytes.

5.3 Baseline Configuration
5.3.1 System-Level Parameters
In this model we chose to implement the so-called “Chen” as a baseline for
conducting simulations and answering research questions [18]. In particular we attempted
to model the Binhu-USTC link of the three-node network. The following figures show
key performance parameters for our implementation:
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Figure 24. System-Level Parameters in Model, Part 1

Figure 25. System-Level Parameters in Model, Part 2

The following table describes the chosen parameter values for our implementation
of the Chen configuration:
Table 14. System-Level Parameters of Chen configuration
Parameter Name

Units

Value

𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡_𝑏𝑡𝑤𝑛_𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝐵𝑜𝑏

km

23

𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦_𝑝𝑒𝑟_𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡_𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ
𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ
𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠_𝑝𝑒𝑟_𝑘𝑚
𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑀𝑃𝑁
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡

sec/km
Mbits/s
dB/km
Mhz
unitless
%

5.00E-06
100
02
4
0.6
75

GB

4

𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦

Justification

Although the Binhu-USTC link is technically 20 km, we
chose a value of 23 km in order to match the efficiency of the
quantum channel, which is measured in Chen as a “total
attenuation” of 4.5 dB [18]. Chen specifically states the loss to
be 0.2 dB/km, which equates to 4 dB of loss. To meet the total
attenuation loss, we added 3 km to the total distance.
Two-thirds the speed of light.
The Fast Ethernet standard bandwidth.
Described by the Chen configuration [18].
Described by the Chen configuration [18].
Described by the Chen configuration [18].
Described by the Chen configuration [18].
Discussions with Subject-Matter Experts yielded values for
Alice and Bob’s total memory.
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𝐴𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑐𝑝𝑢_𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟

work/sec

1.00E+09

𝑑𝐵 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐵𝑜𝑏
𝜂𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟
𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑑

dB
unitless
sec

35
01
2.00E-05

𝐵𝑜𝑏𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦

GB

4

𝐵𝑜𝑏𝑐𝑝𝑢_𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟

work/sec

1.00E+09

Discussions with Subject-Matter Experts yielded values for
Alice and Bob’s CPU power.
Described by the Chen configuration [18].
Described by the Chen configuration [18].
Described by the Chen configuration [18].
Discussions with Subject-Matter Experts yielded values for
Alice and Bob’s total memory.
Discussions with Subject-Matter Experts yielded values for
Alice and Bob’s CPU power.

The following figures show the allocation of Alice and Bob’s memory to each of
the eight QKD phases and the status of the validity of the configuration:

Figure 26. Allocation of Alice/Bob's Memory Per Phase

Figure 27. System Memory Configuration Check

We chose to allocate 10% of Alice and Bob’s total system memory to each of the
phases, except for the more resource intensive Quantum Exchange and Error
Reconciliation, which received 20%. The Valid Configuration Memory Check detects,
via backend logic written in Visual Basic, if there is enough memory allocated to the
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phase for it to proceed based on all of the values that are currently implemented in the
model. The following table describes the backend logic that is being evaluated in code:
Table 15. Valid Configuration Memory Check Logic

Phase
Authentication

Quantum Exchange

Sifting
Error Estimation
Error Reconciliation
Entropy Estimation
Privacy
Amplification

Final Key Generation

Evaluation Logic

Authentication memory must be large enough to store the Auth
key reservoir in addition to a very small amount of memory
required for small operations, default 1024 bytes.
Alice's memory must be at least large enough to hold the
information required for a single pulse, otherwise QE can't run.
Bob's memory must at least be larger than the ratio of sent pulses
at Alice to detections at Bob, in relation to Alice's memory.
Sifting memory must be at least large enough to hold the size of
the sifted key buffers after the sifting efficiency fraction has been
applied.
Error Estimation memory requires only a small amount of
memory necessary for small operations, default 1024 bytes.
Error Reconciliation requires enough memory to receive the bit
buffer from Error Estimation after key sacrifice, plus 30 bytes of
computational memory overhead (NIST numbers for efficient
FPGA implementation [20]) per bit of the block size.
Error Estimation memory requires only a small amount of
memory necessary for small operations, default 1024 bytes.
Checks if the allocated memory for PA is at least twice the size
of the input buffer. To reduce finite key size effects, the input to
PA must be large - on the order of 1 Mbit or more. The matrices
used in the hash calculation must be the same size as the input
buffer, or very close to it, to obtain a privacy amplified key.
In this model we assume that a cryptographic hash is being used
during final key generation, as opposed to a non-cryptographic
Wegman-Carter style hash function that is more computationally
intensive. For more information, see Chapter IV of thesis.
The memory required must therefore be large enough to process
a hash value using a standard hash function, such as SHA-512.
Additionally it requires memory overhead for small computation,
default 1024 bytes.

The following figure shows the computational workload assigned to each phase of
the QKD system:

79

Figure 28. Computational Workload Assigned to Each Phase

Typically computational processing is measured in instructions per second, where
a number of instructions are defined as the amount of work (an instruction is a single
operation of the processor, which is defined by the processor’s instruction set). In this
model, we measure processing as units of work (rather than number of instructions) in
order to reach a level of abstraction removed from any specific architecture. Ideally, we
would run benchmark tests on the phases of operation in a real system to establish a
baseline of work units required for each phase. Given that measurements for work
attributed to a phase for nonspecific architectures are not present in QKD literature, we
have discussed the appropriate values for computational workload with subject-matter
experts and decided on appropriate values for each phase. The relative ratios between
work assigned for each phase is more important than the numbers themselves (e.g., the
work assigned to Authentication is much less than more resource intensive phases such as
Error Reconciliation).

5.3.2 Phase Input Parameters
The following tables describe the input parameters chosen for each of the eight
phases:
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Authentication
Table 16. Input Parameters Local to Authentication
Parameter Name

Units

Value

𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒

bytes

100

𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ_𝑘𝑒𝑦_𝑟𝑒𝑞

bytes

10

𝐴𝐵_𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑚𝑠𝑔_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒

bytes

1490

bytes

10

𝐴𝐵_𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠

unitless

1

unitless

1

𝐵𝐴_𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑚𝑠𝑔_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝐵𝐴_𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠

Justification

The Authentication reservoir must be large enough to authenticate an entire
round of QKD. Since we are assuming that authentication is done once per
round, 1250 bytes is more than sufficient.
The amount of authentication key required from the reservoir to complete a
single authentication. In practical QKD using Wegman-Carter style
authentication, this is the amount of auth key required to authenticate a single
message.
Since authentication uses the ASU-2 version of Wegman-Carter universal
hash families, the amount of key required for authentication can be on the
order of only several bytes, if necessary.
In general, the amount of key needed to authenticate a message is
log2(msg size).
If the MTU of a message is approximately 1500 bytes and the amount of
authentication key required is approximately log2(msg_size), then 1490
should be sufficient size to carry the message to be authenticated with an
appended authentication tag.
The log2(1490) is approximately 10 bytes.
Wegman-Carter authentication only requires a single message to be passed
from Alice to Bob: the message to be authenticated with the appended
authentication tag.
Bob is only required to respond to Alice if the message she sent was authentic
or not, based on his own calculation of the authentication tag.

Quantum Exchange
Table 17. Input Parameters Local to Quantum Exchange
Parameter Name

Units

Value

𝑚𝑒𝑚_𝑟𝑒𝑞_𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒

bytes

5

Justification

Bit and basis can be stored as 2 separate bits. The timing information,
assuming it consists of a frame and slot number, can perhaps be stored as an
unsigned long, which is 4 bytes. Thus 5 total bytes should be sufficient.

Sifting
Table 18. Input Parameters Local to Sifting
Parameter Name

Units

Value

𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑒𝑓𝑓_𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐

unitless

0.5

𝐴𝐵_𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑚𝑠𝑔_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒

bytes

1500

Justification

The BB84 protocol defines the efficiency fraction to be approximately one
half.
Assuming sifting is accomplished by Bob sending his basis measurements to
Alice, she must respond with either which measurements are correct or
incorrect. This is approximately half the amount of information that Bob sent
to Alice.
Representation of this scenario is possible in several different ways: Alice
sends back the same number of messages that Bob sent, but half the size, or
she sends back half the number of messages Bob sent but of the same size.
Since a high volume of data (relative to the other phases) must be transmitted,
we can set the message size to be a full MTU (Maximum Transmission Unit),
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which is 1500 bytes for the TCP/IP protocol.
Assuming sifting is accomplished by Bob sending his basis measurements to
Alice, she must respond with either which measurements are correct or
incorrect. This is approximately half the amount of information that Bob sent
to Alice.
bytes

𝐵𝐴_𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑚𝑠𝑔_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒

𝐴𝐵_𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠

unitless

𝐵𝐴_𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠

unitless

1500

1501

3002

Representation of this scenario is possible in several different ways: Alice
sends back the same number of messages that Bob sent, but half the size, or
she sends back half the number of messages Bob sent but of the same size.
Since a high volume of data (relative to the other phases) must be transmitted,
we can set the message size to be a full MTU (Maximum Transmission Unit),
which is 1500 bytes for the TCP/IP protocol.
In the memory required per pulse, we claimed that bit and basis information
can be captured in 2 bits. If Bob must send his basis information to Alice, he
must send data approximately equal to the size of his pre-sifting bit buffer, to
include timing information for Alice to compare against.
We can therefore divide the raw bit buffer by the chosen average message
size to get an approximate number of transactions required for BobAlice,
and half of that number for transactions required for AliceBob.
In the memory required per pulse, we claimed that bit and basis information
can be captured in 2 bits. If Bob must send his basis information to Alice, he
must send data approximately equal to the size of his pre-sifting bit buffer, to
include timing information for Alice to compare against.
We can therefore divide the raw bit buffer by the chosen average message
size to get an approximate number of transactions required for BobAlice,
and half of that number for transactions required for AliceBob.

Error Estimation
Table 19. Input parameters Local to Error Estimation
Parameter Name

Units

Value

𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠_𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑑_𝑝𝑐𝑡

%

25

𝐴𝐵_𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑚𝑠𝑔_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒

bytes

1500

𝐵𝐴_𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑚𝑠𝑔_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒

bytes

250

𝐴𝐵_𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠

unitless

10

𝐵𝐴_𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠

unitless

1

Justification

The percentage of bits sacrificed must be good enough to get an accurate
error rate, but small enough for sufficient throughput. We chose to sacrifice
25% of the key.
Assuming Alice initiates Error Estimation, she must send data to Bob
approximately equal to the total number of sacrificed bits.
For most buffer sizes this should be enough to fill at least one MTU
(Maximum Transmission Unit) worth of data, which is 1500 bytes under the
TCP/IP protocol.
Bob is only required to send back to Alice the estimated error rate once he
compares her sacrificed bits to his own. This action may be accomplished in
250 bytes or less.
This action should only require a single message worth of data.
Assuming Alice initiates Error Estimation, she must send data to Bob
approximately equal to the total number of sacrificed bits.
The number of transactions required can be estimated by dividing the number
of sacrificed bits by the average AB message size.
Bob is only required to send back to Alice the estimated error rate once he
compares her sacrificed bits to his own.
This action should only require a single message worth of data.

Error Reconciliation
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Table 20. Input Parameters Local to Error Reconciliation
Parameter Name

Units

Value

Justification

𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠_𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑑

bytes

0

𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒

bits

54000

𝐴𝐵_𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑚𝑠𝑔_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒

bytes

1200

No bits are sacrificed while using the LDPC error correction algorithm.
For LDPC this size is dictated by a pre-determined standard matrix. The ETSI
DVB matrix, for instance, was selected for its reasonable 5/6 coding rate and
requires a 54000 bit block [20].
Alice is required to send Bob a parity syndrome of size S=N(1-R), where S is
the size of the syndrome, N is the block size, and R is the coding rate of the
LDPC matrix. For the ETSI DVB matrix, for example, the code rate is 5/6.

𝐵𝐴_𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑚𝑠𝑔_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒

bytes

750

𝐴𝐵_𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠

unitless

1

unitless

1

𝐵𝐴_𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠

In this instance, the size of the syndrome totals 9000 bits, which is
approximately 1200 bytes of information [38].
Bob is required to communicate information back to Alice on how to fix the
errors in her bit buffer.
This amount of data required to communicate this information will be no
greater than the size of the initial syndrome she sent to Bob.
For LDPC, the number of transactions is limited to 1 from AliceBob and 1
from BobAlice for each block (the number of total executions varies
depending on the input buffer).
For LDPC, the number of transactions is limited to 1 from AliceBob and 1
from BobAlice for each block (the number of total executions varies
depending on the input buffer).

Entropy Estimation
Table 21. Input Parameters Local to Entropy Estimation
Parameter Name

Units

Value

𝑝𝑐𝑡_𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦_𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠_𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑅

%

12

𝑝𝑐𝑡_𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦_𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠_𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐

%

12

𝑝𝑐𝑡_𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦_𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠_𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖_𝑝ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑜𝑛

%

12

𝑝𝑐𝑡_𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑦_𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠_𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦

%

4

𝐴𝐵_𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑚𝑠𝑔_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒

bytes

0

𝐵𝐴_𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑚𝑠𝑔_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒

bytes

0

Justification

The percentage of entropy loss on the Quantum Channel was
calculated using the Shannon limit for minimum entropy loss. For
more information, see Chapter IV discussion on Entropy
Estimation.
The percentage of entropy loss on the Classical Channel during
Error Reconciliation was calculated using the Shannon limit for
minimum entropy loss. For more information, see Chapter IV
discussion on Entropy Estimation.
The percentage of entropy loss due to multi-photon pulses was
calculated using the cumulative Poisson probability of multi-photon
pulses.
We assume all multi-photon pulses will be eliminated from the final
key buffer in order to defend against Photon-Number Splitting
(PNS) attacks. For more information, see Chapter IV discussion on
Entropy Estimation.
The percentage of arbitrary safety margin was selected to account
for any unaccounted for entropy loss. For more information, see
Chapter IV discussion on Entropy Estimation.
Alice and Bob independently possess the information required to
calculate the entropy loss, given that they are aware of the entropy
loss calculation procedure before QKD execution begins. It is
therefore not necessary for Alice and Bob to communicate during
this phase. However, it is a practitioner’s design choice whether or
not Alice and Bob should communicate to ensure matching entropy
estimates.
Alice and Bob independently possess the information required to
calculate the entropy loss, given that they are aware of the entropy
loss calculation procedure before QKD execution begins. It is
therefore not necessary for Alice and Bob to communicate during
this phase. However, it is a practitioner’s design choice whether or
not Alice and Bob should communicate to ensure matching entropy
estimates.
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𝐴𝐵_𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠

unitless

0

𝐵𝐴_𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠

unitless

0

Alice and Bob independently possess the information required to
calculate the entropy loss, given that they are aware of the entropy
loss calculation procedure before QKD execution begins. It is
therefore not necessary for Alice and Bob to communicate during
this phase. However, it is a practitioner’s design choice whether or
not Alice and Bob should communicate to ensure matching entropy
estimates.
Alice and Bob independently possess the information required to
calculate the entropy loss, given that they are aware of the entropy
loss calculation procedure before QKD execution begins. It is
therefore not necessary for Alice and Bob to communicate during
this phase. However, it is a practitioner’s design choice whether or
not Alice and Bob should communicate to ensure matching entropy
estimates.

Privacy Amplification
Table 22. Input Parameters Local to Privacy Amplification
Parameter Name

Units

Value

𝑚𝑖𝑛_𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑟𝑒𝑞_𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠

bits

1000000

𝐴𝐵_𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑚𝑠𝑔_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒

bytes

1500

𝐵𝐴_𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑚𝑠𝑔_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒

bytes

500

𝐴𝐵_𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠

unitless

1

unitless

1

𝐵𝐴_𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠

Justification

To reduce finite key size effects, it is suggested that the input to Privacy
Amplification be between 1-100 Mbits [38].
Alice and Bob must communicate a seed to prime random number generation
to construct a very large matrix used in the calculation of Privacy
Amplification.
We assume that Alice initiates this communication, selects the seed, and
communicates it to Bob. The message(s) she sends to Bob will therefore most
likely be larger than the acknowledgment received from Bob.
Alice and Bob must communicate a seed to prime random number generation
to construct a very large matrix used in the calculation of Privacy
Amplification.
We assume that Alice initiates this communication, selects the seed, and
communicates it to Bob. The message(s) she sends to Bob will therefore most
likely be larger than the acknowledgment received from Bob.
The random seed Alice sends to Bob can be sent to Bob in the amount of data
contained in one message.
Bob’s reply is relatively small and can be contained in one message.

Final Key Generation
Table 23. Input Parameters Local to Final Key Generation
Parameter Name

Units

Value

𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑟_𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠

bits

10000

𝐴𝐵_𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑚𝑠𝑔_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒

bytes

64

𝐵𝐴_𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑚𝑠𝑔_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒

bytes

50

unitless

1

unitless

1

𝐴𝐵_𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠
𝐵𝐴_𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠

Justification

We assume Alice and Bob reserve enough bits for Authentication to
refill the entire size of the Authentication reservoir buffer, as defined in
the Authentication phase.
We assume that a standard cryptographic hash, such as SHA-512, is
being used to complete Final Key Generation.
If Alice initiates this hash comparison, she will need to send a message
to Bob of at least 512 bits (the output of the hash function).
After computing the same hash as Alice, Bob is required to confirm that
his hash value is identical to Alice by sending her a response message.
Alice computes a cryptographic hash, which can fit inside one message,
and sends it to Bob.
Bob receives the hash from Alice and replies with a confirmation that
his calculated hash matches hers.
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After establishing reasonable input values for the phase calculations, we can
observe the final performance metrics of the configuration by selecting a desired number
of final key bits, as shown in the figure below:

Figure 29. Readout of Model Performance Metrics

The interpretation of performance in terms of number of QE, ER, and PA routines
assumes the execution of Quantum Exchange will continue until Alice’s QE memory
buffer is filled, ER will run as many times as necessary to process the input as a result of
QE and subsequent phases, and PA will only execute if there are enough key bits to meet
the minimum requirement (i.e., one million bits). If there are not enough key bits, QE will
restart as many times as necessary to meet PA requirements. The flow of this process can
be seen in the following figure:

85

Figure 30. Execution Flow of Practical QKD System

5.4 Use Case: Answering Fundamental Performance Questions
5.4.1 Performance Metrics
In the design of this model, the user is required to enter a desired amount of final
key in order to calculate performance metrics. The following tests were performed with 1
Mbit of desired final key using parameters from the Chen configuration and under the
assumptions described in Section 5.1. The table below shows the results of increasing the
percentage of memory allocated to Alice for Quantum Exchange out of a total of 4GB,
incremented from 1 to 50% of her total memory.
Table 24. Table of Performance Metrics Produced By Model
Alice’s
QE
Memory
(% of
4GB)

1
2
3

Alice’s
QE
Memory
(GB)

Final
Key Bits
(Mbit)

Final
Key
Rate
(kbps)

System
Runtime
(sec)

Total
QE
Routines

Total
ER
Routines

Total
PA
Routines

Total
QKD
Rounds

0.04
0.08
0.12

1.19
1.19
1.19

2.38
3.13
3.5

501
381
340

120
60
40

120
60
40

2
2
2

2
2
2
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4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

0.16
0.2
0.24
0.28
0.32
0.36
0.4
0.44
0.48
0.52
0.56
0.6
0.64
0.68
0.72
0.76
0.8
0.84
0.88
0.92
0.96
1.0
1.04
1.08
1.12
1.16
1.2
1.24
1.28
1.32
1.36
1.4
1.44
1.48
1.52
1.56
1.6
1.64
1.68
1.72
1.76
1.8
1.84
1.88
1.92
1.96
2.0

1.19
1.19
1.19
1.25
1.27
1.25
1.19
1.31
1.19
1.29
1.39
1.19
1.27
1.35
1.43
1.51
1.19
1.25
1.31
1.37
1.43
1.49
1.56
1.62
1.68
1.74
1.19
1.23
1.27
1.31
1.35
1.39
1.43
1.47
1.51
1.56
1.6
1.64
1.68
1.72
1.76
1.8
1.84
1.88
1.92
1.96
1.00

3.13
3.34
3.50
3.28
3.4
3.5
3.34
3.43
3.5
3.38
3.45
3.5
3.4
3.46
3.51
3.52
3.46
3.5
3.54
3.47
3.5
3.55
3.48
3.52
3.55
3.49
3.5
3.53
3.48
3.5
3.53
3.56
3.51
3.53
3.56
3.51
3.54
3.56
3.52
3.54
3.56
3.52
3.54
3.56
3.52
3.54
3.56

380
356
340
382
375
358
356
383
340
382
404
340
374
391
409
426
344
358
371
396
409
422
447
460
473
498
340
349
366
375
383
392
409
417
426
443
451
460
477
486
494
511
520
528
545
554
281
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30
24
20
18
16
14
12
12
10
10
10
8
8
8
8
8
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
2

60
48
40
54
48
42
48
48
40
50
50
40
48
48
48
48
42
42
42
48
48
48
54
54
54
60
40
40
44
44
44
44
48
48
48
52
52
52
56
56
56
60
60
60
64
64
32

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1

The table reveals the cyclical nature of achieving a desired number of final key
bits. The model assumes that Quantum Exchange will run until all of Alice’s memory
allocated for QE has been filled. This assumption presents the possibility of a scenario
where even if the amount of final key already generated is very close to the desired final
key bits, Quantum Exchange will be forced to run again until Alice fills her memory,
resulting in a final number of bits in excess of the desired number of bits.
This effect is magnified by the presence of a minimum number of required bits to
perform Privacy Amplification (in this case 1 Mbit). For example, when 49% of Alice’s
memory is allocated for QE, it results in 1.96 Mbit of final key being generated and
requires 4 iterations of QE. At 50% memory allocation, exactly 1 Mbit of key is
generated with only 2 iterations of QE. This scenario is the result of having to perform
QE enough times to perform PA more than once, as opposed to having to perform PA
only once.
The following graph illustrates the need for an increased number of ER routines
until the amount of allocated memory reaches a threshold such that fewer QE routines are
required to attain the desired number of final key bits. We can see the most radical dropoff at 50% where both fewer QE and PA routines are necessary to achieve the desired
number of final key bits, which consequently results in fewer required ER routines.
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Figure 31. Graph of Routines Required to Achieve 1 Mbit Final Key

5.4.2 Bounds on Final Key Rate
The Chen configuration advertises a sifted key rate of approximately 10.5 kbps
[18]. Given the BB84 protocol was used in this configuration, we can assume that the
protocol efficiency fraction (applied to sifting) is approximately 0.5. In other words half
of Bob’s detection rate should result in a reasonable estimation of the sifted key rate.
Similarly, doubling the sifted key rate should result in a reasonable estimate for Bob’s
detection rate. We should expect a detection rate around 21,000 detections per second at
Bob in order to achieve a sifted key rate of 10.5 kbps in the Chen configuration.
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The detection rate in the model is 20,964 detections per second, which is just
under the 21,000 we expected to see for Chen. Therefore we can assume this model
provides a reasonable representation of the Chen detection rate. If we apply similar logic
from the derivation of the sifted key rate to the losses incurred during other phases of the
system, we can establish an upper bound on the final key rate that can be achieved based
on the initial detection rate. The following table shows the reduction in potential final key
rate as a result of imposed configuration losses incurred during Sifting, Error Estimation,
and Privacy Amplification based on a 20,964 det/sec detection rate (for descriptions of
incurred loss refer to Section 5.3):
Table 25. Theoretical Bounded Key Rates During Phases With Loss

Phase

Losses Incurred

Sifting
Error Estimation
Privacy Amplification

50%
25%
40%

Resultant Key
Rate (kbps)
10.482
7.861
4.716

Considering there are no major losses incurred during the other phases and barring the
inclusion of any communications and/or processing overhead, 4.716 kbps is the
theoretical upper bound on the performance of the configuration implemented in the
model.
We can now evaluate the final key rate performance of the entire system and
compare it to the upper bound. The following graph compares the final key rate against
the percentage of Quantum Exchange memory allocated for Alice while attempting to
generate 1 Mbit of desired final key (the data contained in this graph can be viewed in
Table 23):
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Figure 32. Graph of Alice Memory Effect on Final Key Rate

As the amount of allocated memory increases, the final key rate appears to
emulate a sigmoid curve function with an approximate ceiling of 3.6 kbps. We also
observe the cyclical fluctuations of the key rate due to the inability to generate exactly 1
Mbit of desired key. It appears that an arbitrarily large amount of memory allocated to
Alice will only have a marginal performance benefit as it approaches a limit on
performance. To get closer to the asymptotic bound on final key rate, performance in
other areas of the system will most likely need to be improved.

5.4.3 Increased Processing Power
In this model we assume that both Alice and Bob have identical processing
power. Additionally, we assume the processor is fully available to each phase (i.e., does
not suffer from decreased performance due to the existence of concurrent processes). We
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initially set Alice and Bob’s processing power to one billion work units per second. The
following table shows the effects on final key rate and system runtime by increasing the
power of the CPU from 1 to 16 billion units of work per second while the rest of the
system configuration remained unchanged:
Table 26. Table of Performance Metrics Compared to CPU Power
Alice/Bob CPU
Power
(work units/sec)

1.00E+09
2.00E+09
3.00E+09
4.00E+09
5.00E+09
6.00E+09
7.00E+09
8.00E+09
9.00E+09
10.00E+9
11.00E+9
12.00E+9
13.00E+9
14.00E+9
15.00E+9
16.00E+9

Final Key Rate
(kbps)

System Runtime
(sec)

3.46
3.94
4.13
4.24
4.30
4.34
4.37
4.40
4.42
4.43
4.45
4.46
4.47
4.47
4.48
4.49

344.97
302.96
288.96
281.96
277.76
274.96
272.96
271.46
270.29
269.36
268.60
267.96
267.42
266.96
266.56
266.21

The following graph shows the effect of increased processing power on the final
key rate:
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Figure 33. Graph Comparing Final Key Rate to CPU Power

It is clear that processing power and final key rate share an approximately
logarithmic relationship. The final key rate quickly approaches the theoretical 4.716 kbps
asymptotic bound, but exhibits diminishing returns on performance above 8 billion work
units per second. This phenomenon can perhaps best be described by Amdahl’s law on
system design [44], which states that system performance will not be indefinitely
improved by increasing the performance of one component in the system. An arbitrarily
large increase in CPU power will never exceed the asymptotic bound on final key rate. In
order to increase the final throughput, the performance bound must be increased.
Increasing the performance of one component moves the bottleneck to another
component. As we have seen, the performance bound is dictated by the detection rate at
Bob, which is ultimately dictated by the pulse rate at Alice, loses on the quantum
channel, and the dead time of Bob’s detectors.
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The following graph shows the effect of increased processing power on the
system runtime:

Figure 34. Graph Comparing System Runtime to CPU Power

There appears to be an exponential decrease in the system runtime as processing power is
increased. Therefore system runtime and final key rate share an inverse relationship with
respect to the processing power of the system. The decrease in runtime exhibits similar
behavior to the final key rate – an arbitrarily large increase in CPU power will experience
diminishing returns in the total execution time of the system.
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VI. Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Research Relevance
Research in the field of Quantum Key Distribution performance has historically
been achieved by the alleviation of one or more bottlenecks in the hopes of increasing
final key throughput. These bottlenecks occur at specific chokepoints in the system, such
as Bob’s detectors or the resource intensive post-processing algorithms. The best way to
gauge system throughput performance, aside from observed results, has been the use of
various forms of a secure key rate equation. This research models other aspects of QKD
systems not captured by these formulas, such as system memory, CPU power, classical
communications, and time.
The model presented in this thesis represents the performance characteristics of
both the quantum and classical processing of QKD, and is tailorable to implementationspecific systems. The goal was to build a model for QKD practitioners that provides more
accurate predictions of throughput performance in the design of systems, and a heuristic
method of finding optimality in systems that are already deployed, while at the same time
educate the practitioner on the abundance of major system dependencies and trade-offs in
design that may be detrimental to key throughput.
6.2 Answering Research Questions
RQ1: What are the parameters that define a Quantum Key Distribution system?
In Chapter IV Section 2, we characterized QKD in terms of several components:
Alice, Bob, the classical channel, and the quantum channel. Thus, the parameters that
define these components will define the system. A distinction is made between the
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attributes local to each of these components in a one-way QKD system (i.e., defined as
Alice being the sender of photons and Bob the receiver of photons). Alice and Bob both
share a total amount of system memory and computational power, and the classical and
quantum channels both share a finite distance between Alice and Bob, in addition to a
propagation delay per unit of distance. All other parameters are local to each component
and describe its behavior.
Since Alice must send photons, she is defined by a pulse rate, a Mean Photon
Number, and a percentage of signal states. As the receiver of photons, Bob is defined by
loss, the efficiency of his detectors, and the dead time of the detectors. The classical
channel is also defined by the total bandwidth of the channel, whereas the quantum
channel is defined by a loss associated with transmission.
RQ2: What phases exist in all Quantum Key Distribution systems?
The model presented in Chapter IV was derived from a review of the system
processes outlined in QKD literature. It consists of a series of independently modeled
phases, which provide an aggregate performance prediction of total final bits, the total
system execution time, as well as execution time bit buffer sizes for each intermediate
phase. The phases considered in this model include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Authentication
Quantum Exchange
Sifting
Error Estimation
Error Reconciliation
Entropy Estimation
Privacy Amplification
Final Key Generation

RQ3: What are the necessary input and output parameters to define a phase?
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System performance in QKD is generally measured in final key bits per second.
Thus, the necessary inputs and outputs to each phase must, at minimum, address the issue
of key bits and time. The inputs and outputs required to track key bits throughout system
execution are the key buffer as an input from the previous phase, and the amount of key
that is lost as a result of executing the current phase. The resulting size of the output key
buffer will either be the same size as the input buffer (if no bits are lost or sacrificed
during the phase) or smaller than the input buffer as a result of lost or sacrificed bits.
The notion of time to execute a phase has two primary components:
computational time and transmission time. If the amount of the work required for each
phase is determined prior to execution and Alice/Bob possess a computational power that
is also defined prior to execution, then the computational time required is known. This
time requirement is addressed in the Controls & Mechanisms aspect of the ICOM
modeling, considering these predetermined aspects of time are not inputs to the phase
itself. The transmission time is defined as inputs to each phase in the form of average
message size and total number of transactions that must be passed back and forth between
Alice and Bob. The total time of transmission is then dictated by the transmission time
equation as a function of message size, number of transactions, and bandwidth of the
classical channel.
RQ4: Can the notion of system time and performance be measured at the phase level?
In the answer to RQ3 we established that the primary factor in determining
necessary inputs and outputs to a phase is final key throughput, which consists of both
time and bit buffer components. In order to calculate the time required to execute QKD, it
is necessary to know the execution time of each phase. The total system time can then be
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determined by the summation of phase time, where each phase is executed an
independent number of times (i.e., QE may occur more times than PA). Similarly,
computational performance of the phase is predetermined at the phase level based on an
assigned measure of work for the phase and the computational power of Alice/Bob. The
aggregate performance is then determined by number of times a particular phase is
executed.
RQ5: Can a system-level throughput model be developed that incorporates time, system
memory, computational power, and the speed of classical communication?
Yes. If computational power, system memory, and the speed of classical
communication are dictated by the definition of the system itself (i.e., system
characterization in Chapter IV), then these metrics can be used to calculate the time
required to complete each of the eight phases of a QKD system, defined in Chapter III.
The total execution time of the system can then be determined by the number of times
each phase is required to execute.
RQ6: If so, how can it be used to answer fundamental performance questions of QKD
such as, “How many Quantum Exchange, Error Reconciliation, and Privacy
Amplification routines are necessary to achieve a desired amount final key?”
The answer to fundamental performance questions relies upon a definition of
what constitutes a single QKD round. In Chapter V, we defined a serial implementation
of QKD, in which a single round consisted of executing Quantum Exchange, Sifting,
Error Estimation, Error Reconciliation, and Entropy Estimation multiple times in order to
achieve a minimum desired key buffer size as an input to Privacy Amplification. Since
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we defined the style of execution, we can determine how many rounds of phase will be
required to generate a desired number of final key bits.
RQ7: What are the implications of altering the amount of Alice’s memory allocated for
Quantum Exchange?
As Alice’s memory is increased, the number of Quantum Exchange routines will
decrease and the number of Error Reconciliation routines will increase proportional to
QE. The number of Privacy Amplification routines will remain relatively constant since it
cannot execute until a minimum threshold is met. The final key rate also increases as
Alice’s QE memory increases, but only to an extent. There is an asymptotic upper bound
on final key rate that is dictated by the losses imposed on the system at various phases.
The final key rate reaches a logistical ceiling below the asymptotic bound and does not
increase indefinitely as QE memory is increased.
RQ8: What are the implications of altering computational power for Alice and Bob?
In the answer to RQ7, we recognized that there is an asymptotic upper bound on
final key rate in a QKD system, and that increasing the memory allocated to Alice for
Quantum Exchange will cause the final key rate to find an intermediate upper bound.
Increasing the computational power allocated to Alice and Bob will cause a logarithmic
increase final key rate as it quickly approaches the asymptotic upper bound. It is
considered asymptotic because regardless of how much computational power is given to
both Alice and Bob, the bound will never be reached because the time required for
classical communication cannot be eliminated completely. Additionally, the time
required for system execution experiences an exponential decrease as computational
power is increased.
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RQ9: How can this model be used to study Quantum Key Distribution systems?
The answers to research questions 6, 7, and 8 demonstrate several examples of
studies that can be performed using the model. In general, the outputs of the model are
performance metrics of QKD execution for a particular configuration. Therefore in order
to study QKD systems, either alterations to the definition of QKD execution or the
configuration itself must be altered to observe new behavior.
6.3 Contributions and Future Work
This research effort began as an investigation into optimal execution patterns for
Quantum Key Distribution systems. QKD literature describes the execution of the phases
in a serial manner, but there may be more optimal solutions in the form of pipelining,
concurrency, or parallelization. It became apparent that the mechanism to study
alternative execution patterns did not exist, and this thesis set out to create those
mechanisms. As a result, the throughput model that resulted from this research suggests
that increasing the size of system memory (in excess of the memory necessary to run the
system) only marginally improves performance. A better return on investment may
instead be realized by increasing the CPU power of Alice and Bob, although even then
the improvement in system performance exhibits the behavior of Amdahl’s law. It
appears the most effective way to achieve the highest amount of throughput is to raise the
asymptotic bound on final throughput that is dictated by the detection rate at Bob. It is the
authoritative speed limit on the rest of the QKD system.
The major contribution of this research includes a mathematical model used to
assess the performance of QKD systems. It differs from current interpretations in
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literature by incorporating post-processing performance characteristics as well as
memory constraints that expand upon the protocol-centric focus in evaluating final
throughput. This allows for practitioners to make more educated decisions in the design
of their systems as well as search for optimization of parameters or design choices in
currently implemented systems. In addition, understanding the trade-offs and
dependencies that exist within QKD allows designers to achieve a desired throughput rate
around constraints, such as the need to use a particular detector or laser source.
Future work in this area could include finding optimality or trade-offs in
alternative execution styles, such as continuous Quantum Exchange, ratios of executions
between Sifting and Error Correction to Privacy Amplification as it relates to final key
throughput, and optimal buffer sizes going into each successive phase. Additionally, the
use of Amdahl’s law could be used to quantify the bounds on optimality at the phase
level, and how it relates to the theoretical upper bound on throughput if the phases are
viewed as “threads” in a parallel system.
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Appendix A: Equations
System Time
The total system runtime can be described as:
𝑛

𝑚

𝑇𝑠𝑦𝑠 = � � 𝑇𝑖,𝑗
𝑖=0 𝑗=1

where i is the total time through phase i, based on m iterations required for that phase,
where 𝑇𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ  𝑇𝐹𝐾𝐺 are represented numerically as i = 0, 1, 2, …7.
Transmission Time
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑚𝑠𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 , 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ, 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 ) =

𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑡𝑤𝑛_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑚𝑠𝑔 =

𝑚𝑠𝑔_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠)
𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ � 𝑠 �

𝑚𝑠𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠)
∙ 𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠 + 𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝_𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦 (𝑠𝑒𝑐)
𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ �
�
𝑠𝑒𝑐

Authentication, i = 0
𝑇𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ = 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑚𝑠𝑔_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒{𝐴𝐵,𝐵𝐴} , 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ, 𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠{𝐴𝐵,𝐵𝐴} ) +

{𝐴, 𝐵}𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ
{𝐴, 𝐵}𝑐𝑝𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟

𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑟_𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 = (𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 − 𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ_𝑘𝑒𝑦_𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑)

Quantum Exchange, i = 1
Note: In the case of QE, we assume the end of the phase is signaled by the entire free
memory buffer being filled.
𝑇𝑄𝐸 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 �

{𝐴, 𝐵}𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑄𝐸
𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑑𝑒𝑡_𝑎𝑡_𝐵𝑜𝑏
+ 𝑡𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝_𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦 ,
�
{𝐴, 𝐵}𝑐𝑝𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑑𝑒𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒

𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠(𝑋 ≥ 1) = 1 − 𝑒 −𝜇
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𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒𝑠_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 =

𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑚_𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙
𝑚𝑒𝑚_𝑟𝑒𝑞_𝑝𝑒𝑟_𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒

𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑑𝑒𝑡_𝑎𝑡_𝐵𝑜𝑏 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒𝑠_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠(𝑋 ≥ 1) ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∙ 𝜂𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 ∙ 𝜂𝐵𝑜𝑏 ∙ 𝜂𝑑𝑒𝑡

𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑡𝑤𝑛_𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒_𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙 =

1
𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠(𝑋 ≥ 1) ∙ 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∙ 𝜂𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 ∙ 𝜂𝐵𝑜𝑏 ∙ 𝜂𝑑𝑒𝑡

𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑑
𝑡𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑡𝑤𝑛_𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑙 �
� ∙ 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑡𝑤𝑛_𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒_𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑡𝑤𝑛_𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒_𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑑𝑒𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =

1

𝑡𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒_𝑏𝑡𝑤𝑛_𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒𝑠_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∙ 𝑚𝑒𝑚_𝑟𝑒𝑞_𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒
𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑑𝑒𝑡_𝑎𝑡_𝐵𝑜𝑏 ∙ 𝑚𝑒𝑚_𝑟𝑒𝑞_𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒

𝐴𝑄𝐸_𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑘𝑒𝑦_𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒𝑠_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝐵𝑄𝐸_𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑘𝑒𝑦_𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑑𝑒𝑡_𝐵𝑜𝑏

Sifting, i = 2
𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑓𝑡 = 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑚𝑠𝑔_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒{𝐴𝐵,𝐵𝐴} , 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ, 𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠{𝐴𝐵,𝐵𝐴} ) +
𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 = 𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑡_𝑒𝑓𝑓_𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐 ∙

𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 = 𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟

𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑤𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟

𝑚𝑒𝑚_𝑟𝑒𝑞_𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑒

Error Estimation, i = 3
𝑇𝐸𝑟𝑟𝐸𝑠𝑡 = 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑚𝑠𝑔_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒{𝐴𝐵,𝐵𝐴} , 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ, 𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠{𝐴𝐵,𝐵𝐴} )
+

{𝐴, 𝐵}𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝐸𝑟𝑟𝐸𝑠𝑡
{𝐴, 𝐵}𝑐𝑝𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟

{𝐴, 𝐵}𝐸𝑟𝑟𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 = (1 − 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠_𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑝𝑐𝑡 ) ∙ {𝐴, 𝐵}𝑆𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟
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{𝐴, 𝐵}𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑓𝑡
{𝐴, 𝐵}𝑐𝑝𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟

Error Reconciliation, i = 4
{𝐴, 𝐵}𝐸𝑟𝑟𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟
𝑇𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑐 = 𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑙 �
�
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒

∙ �𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑚𝑠𝑔_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒{𝐴𝐵,𝐵𝐴} , 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ, 𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠{𝐴𝐵,𝐵𝐴} )
+

{𝐴, 𝐵}𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑐
�
{𝐴, 𝐵}𝑐𝑝𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟

{𝐴, 𝐵}𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 = {𝐴, 𝐵}𝐸𝑟𝑟𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 − (𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠_𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑑 ∙ 𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑒𝑟𝑟_𝑟𝑒𝑐)
𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑒𝑟𝑟_𝑟𝑒𝑐 = 𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑙 �

{𝐴, 𝐵}𝐸𝑟𝑟𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟
𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒

�

Entropy Estimation, i = 5
𝑇𝐸𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑠𝑡 = 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑚𝑠𝑔_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒{𝐴𝐵,𝐵𝐴} , 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ, 𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠{𝐴𝐵,𝐵𝐴} ) +

{𝐴, 𝐵}𝐸𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 = {𝐴, 𝐵}𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟

{𝐴, 𝐵}𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝐸𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑠𝑡
{𝐴, 𝐵}𝑐𝑝𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟

𝑁𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒 = (1 − 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠_𝑝𝑐𝑡) ∙ {𝐴, 𝐵}𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟

Privacy Amplification, i = 6
𝑇𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝐴𝑚𝑝 = 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑚𝑠𝑔_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒{𝐴𝐵,𝐵𝐴} , 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ, 𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠{𝐴𝐵,𝐵𝐴} ) +

{𝐴, 𝐵}𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 = 𝑁𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒

{𝐴, 𝐵}𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝐴𝑚𝑝
{𝐴, 𝐵}𝑐𝑝𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟

Final Key Generation, i = 7
𝑇𝐹𝐾𝐺 = 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒(𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑚𝑠𝑔_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒{𝐴𝐵,𝐵𝐴} , 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ, 𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠{𝐴𝐵,𝐵𝐴} ) +

{𝐴, 𝐵}𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝐹𝐾𝐺
{𝐴, 𝐵}𝑐𝑝𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟

{𝐴, 𝐵}𝐹𝐾𝐺𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 = {𝐴, 𝐵}𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑏𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 − 𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ_𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑜𝑖𝑟_𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠

104

Appendix B: Model Code
The following code is associated with ‘Sheet1’ of the Excel model:
Private Sub Worksheet_Change(ByVal Target As Excel.Range)
Dim num_bytes_in_gigabyte As Double
Dim num_bits_in_gigabyte As Double
Dim num_bits_in_byte As Double
Dim notional_memory_requirement_for_small_operations As Integer
Dim mem_required_per_ER_block As Integer
num_bytes_in_gigabyte = 1073741824
num_bits_in_gigabyte = 8589934592#
num_bits_in_byte = 8
mem_required_per_ER_block = 30 'bytes
notional_memory_requirement_for_small_operations = 1024 'bytes

'Enable events on current worksheet
Application.EnableEvents = False
Target.Activate
Application.EnableEvents = True

'Alice memory allocation check if memory is greater than 100%
If Range("C27").Value > "1" Then
Cells(27, 3).Interior.ColorIndex = 3
Cells(10, 10).Interior.ColorIndex = 3
Else
Cells(27, 3).Interior.Color = RGB(146, 208, 80)
Cells(10, 10).Interior.Color = RGB(255, 204, 153)
End If
'Bob memory allocation check if allocated memory is greater than 100%
If Range("F27").Value > "1" Then
Cells(27, 6).Interior.ColorIndex = 3
Cells(10, 14).Interior.ColorIndex = 3
Else
Cells(27, 6).Interior.Color = RGB(146, 208, 80)
Cells(10, 14).Interior.Color = RGB(255, 204, 153)
End If
'Auth memory configuration check
'Checks if allocated memory is greater than auth reservoir size plus some
notional amount of memory overhead
If (Range("D18").Value * num_bytes_in_gigabyte) >
Worksheets("Sheet2").Range("B15").Value +
notional_memory_requirement_for_small_operations And _
(Range("G18").Value * num_bytes_in_gigabyte) >
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Worksheets("Sheet2").Range("B15").Value +
notional_memory_requirement_for_small_operations Then
Cells(18, 13).Interior.Color = RGB(146, 208, 80)
Else
Cells(18, 13).Interior.ColorIndex = 3
End If
'Quantum Exchange memory configuration check
'Checks if allocated memory for Alice is greater than the size of memory
required to store information on a single pulse, the minimum memory required
for quantum exchange
'Checks if the ratio of allocated memory between Alice and Bob is at least the
ratio between sent pulses and detections
If (Range("D19").Value * num_bytes_in_gigabyte >
Worksheets("Sheet2").Range("B34").Value) And _
(Range("D19").Value / Range("G19").Value <
Worksheets("Sheet2").Range("G41").Value /
Worksheets("Sheet2").Range("G46").Value) Then
Cells(19, 13).Interior.Color = RGB(146, 208, 80)
Else
Cells(19, 13).Interior.ColorIndex = 3
End If
'Sifting memory configuration check
'Checks if allocated memory is at least greater than sifting_eff_frac *
num_detections_at_bob
If (Range("D20").Value * num_bits_in_gigabyte >
Worksheets("Sheet2").Range("B78").Value *
Worksheets("Sheet2").Range("G46").Value) And _
(Range("G20").Value * num_bits_in_gigabyte >
Worksheets("Sheet2").Range("B78").Value *
Worksheets("Sheet2").Range("G46").Value) Then
Cells(20, 13).Interior.Color = RGB(146, 208, 80)
Else
Cells(20, 13).Interior.ColorIndex = 3
End If
'Error Estimation memory configuration check
'Checks if memory allocated is at least greater than some notional amount of
memory overhead
If (Range("D21").Value * num_bytes_in_gigabyte >
notional_memory_requirement_for_small_operations) And _
(Range("G21").Value * num_bytes_in_gigabyte >
notional_memory_requirement_for_small_operations) Then
Cells(21, 13).Interior.Color = RGB(146, 208, 80)
Else
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Cells(21, 13).Interior.ColorIndex = 3
End If
'Error Reconciliation memory configuration check
'Checks if memory allocated is at least greater than the size of bit buffer
after experiencing sacrifice during Err Est + 30 bytes of computational memory
overhead * block_size
If (Range("D22").Value * num_bits_in_gigabyte >
Worksheets("Sheet2").Range("B102").Value *
Worksheets("Sheet2").Range("N84").Value + mem_required_per_ER_block *
num_bits_in_byte * Worksheets("Sheet2").Range("B125").Value) And _
(Range("G22").Value * num_bits_in_gigabyte >
Worksheets("Sheet2").Range("B102").Value *
Worksheets("Sheet2").Range("N84").Value + num_mem_bytes_required_per_ER_block *
num_bits_in_byte * Worksheets("Sheet2").Range("B125").Value) Then
Cells(22, 13).Interior.Color = RGB(146, 208, 80)
Else
Cells(22, 13).Interior.ColorIndex = 3
End If
'Entropy Estimation memory configuration check
'Checks if memory allocated is at least greater than some notional amount of
memory overhead
If (Range("D23").Value * num_bytes_in_gigabyte >
notional_memory_requirement_for_small_operations) And _
(Range("G23").Value * num_bytes_in_gigabyte >
notional_memory_requirement_for_small_operations) Then
Cells(23, 13).Interior.Color = RGB(146, 208, 80)
Else
Cells(23, 13).Interior.ColorIndex = 3
End If
'Privacy Amplification memory configuration check
'Checks if memory allocated is at least greater than twice the size of the
input into PA
'The matrix used for PA is approx the same size as the input key length into
PA, a smaller matrix results in a compression of the final key size (before
N_secure subtraction) - minmum compression (the ratio between the length of the
output and
'input keys, i.e. the ratio between the number of rows and columns of the
Toeplitz matrix) = 0%
If (Worksheets("Sheet2").Range("N158").Value >
Worksheets("Sheet2").Range("B179").Value) Then
If (Range("D24").Value * num_bytes_in_gigabyte >
Worksheets("Sheet2").Range("N158").Value * 2) And _
(Range("D24").Value * num_bytes_in_gigabyte >
Worksheets("Sheet2").Range("N158").Value * 2) Then
Cells(24, 13).Interior.Color = RGB(146, 208, 80)
Else
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Cells(24, 13).Interior.ColorIndex = 3
End If
Else
If (Range("D24").Value * num_bytes_in_gigabyte >
Application.Ceiling(Worksheets("Sheet2").Range("B179").Value /
Worksheets("Sheet2").Range("N158").Value, 1) *
Worksheets("Sheet2").Range("N158").Value * 2) And _
(Range("G24").Value * num_bytes_in_gigabyte >
Application.Ceiling(Worksheets("Sheet2").Range("B179").Value /
Worksheets("Sheet2").Range("N158").Value, 1) *
Worksheets("Sheet2").Range("N158").Value * 2) Then
Cells(24, 13).Interior.Color = RGB(146, 208, 80)
Else
Cells(24, 13).Interior.ColorIndex = 3
End If
End If

'Final Key Generation memory configuration check
'Checks if memory allocated is at least greater than some notional amount of
memory overhead + SHA-512 requirements ~2kb
If (Range("D25").Value * num_bytes_in_gigabyte >
notional_memory_requirement_for_small_operations + 2048) And _
(Range("G25").Value * num_bytes_in_gigabyte >
notional_memory_requirement_for_small_operations + 2048) Then
Cells(25, 13).Interior.Color = RGB(146, 208, 80)
Else
Cells(25, 13).Interior.ColorIndex = 3
End If
End Sub

The following code is associated with ‘Sheet2’ of the Excel model:
Private Sub CommandButton1_Click()
'This subroutine determines final performance metrics when the Calculate button
is clicked and the desired number of final bits is > 0
Dim num_bits_in_megabit As Double
Dim num_bits_in_kilobit As Double
num_bits_in_megabit = 1000000
num_bits_in_kilobit = 1000
'Determines final performance metrics
If Range("B3").Value > 0 Then
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Cells(3, 2).Interior.Color = RGB(255, 204, 153)
If (Range("N158").Value > Range("B179").Value) Then
'Actual final key bits
Range("B5").Value = (Application.Ceiling((Range("B3").Value *
num_bits_in_megabit) / Range("N205").Value, 1) * Range("N205").Value) /
num_bits_in_megabit
'Total PA routines
Range("G7").Value = Application.Ceiling((Range("B3").Value *
num_bits_in_megabit) / Range("N205").Value, 1)
'Total QKD rounds
Range("G8").Value = Range("G7").Value
'Total QE routines
Range("G5").Value = Range("G8").Value
'Total ER routines
Range("G6").Value = Range("G5").Value * Range("L137")
'Total System Runtime: add up all of phases that only occur once per
round, then calculate ER time
Range("B7").Value = (Range("G8").Value * Range("L18").Value + _
Range("G8").Value * Range("L38").Value + _
Range("G8").Value * Range("L79").Value + _
Range("G8").Value * Range("L103").Value + _
Range("G8").Value * Range("L153").Value + _
Range("G8").Value * Range("L179").Value + _
Range("G8").Value * Range("L200").Value) + _
Range("G6").Value * Range("L125").Value
'Actual final key rate
Range("B6").Value = ((Range("B5").Value * num_bits_in_megabit) /
Range("B7").Value) / num_bits_in_kilobit
Else
Dim num_QE_to_reach_PA As Double
Dim num_bits_end_FKG As Double
num_QE_to_reach_PA = Application.Ceiling(Range("B179").Value /
Range("N158").Value, 1)
num_bits_end_FKG = (num_QE_to_reach_PA * Range("N164").Value) Range("B199").Value
'Actual final key bits
Range("B5").Value = (Application.Ceiling((Range("B3").Value *
num_bits_in_megabit) / num_bits_end_FKG, 1) * num_bits_end_FKG) /
num_bits_in_megabit
'Total PA routines
Range("G7").Value = Application.Ceiling((Range("B3").Value *
num_bits_in_megabit) / num_bits_end_FKG, 1)
'Total QKD rounds
Range("G8").Value = Range("G7").Value
'Total QE routines
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Range("G5").Value = num_QE_to_reach_PA * Range("G7").Value
'Total ER routines
Range("G6").Value = Range("G5").Value * Range("L137")
'Total System Runtime: the only phases that occur once per round
are Auth, PA, and FKG; all other pahses run "Total QE" number of times
Range("B7").Value = (Range("G8").Value * Range("L18").Value + _
Range("G8").Value * Range("L179").Value + _
Range("G8").Value * Range("L200").Value) + _
(Range("G5").Value * Range("L38").Value + _
Range("G5").Value * Range("L79").Value + _
Range("G5").Value * Range("L103").Value + _
Range("G5").Value * Range("L153").Value) + _
Range("G5").Value * Range("L125").Value
'Actual final key rate
Range("B6").Value = ((Range("B5").Value * num_bits_in_megabit) /
Range("B7").Value) / num_bits_in_kilobit
End If
Else
Cells(3, 2).Interior.ColorIndex = 3
End If
End Sub

Private Sub Worksheet_Change(ByVal Target As Excel.Range)
'Enable events on current worksheet
Application.EnableEvents = False
Target.Activate
Application.EnableEvents = True
'Checks if the total amount of entropy loss is greater than 100% of the key
If Range("G156").Value > "1" Then
Cells(156, 7).Interior.ColorIndex = 3
Else
Cells(156, 7).Interior.Color = RGB(198, 239, 206)
End If
End Sub
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